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crucial now than ever before.  Like other government agencies, the Navy is facing an 
increasing number of budget restraints.  This is causing the Navy to look for new ways to 
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markets.  This thesis looks at the feasibility of the Navy leveraging commercial sector 
investments to find dual-use technologies that have application in the Navy.  By 
evaluating current government “venture” initiatives and matching them against the 
Navy’s goals for venture capital, this research shows that the Navy could benefit by 
engaging the venture community.  Based on the research, this thesis provides 
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For years, the federal government has been the leader in developing technologies 
such as communication satellites, space travel, the internet, and several other society 
changing advances.  However, in the 1990s, the innovation shifted to the profitable 
commercial sector.  There has been a dramatic shift in Research and Development (R&D) 
funding in the U.S. economy over the past twenty-five years.  Prior to the 1970’s, the 
federal government was the largest contributor to U.S. R&D.  Since then, the federal 
government’s contributions have remained fairly flat in constant dollars, while industry 
has shown growth in funding U.S. R&D each year.1  Total U.S. R&D spending is 
projected to exceed $300 billion in 2005 with $190 billion of that being provided from 
industry R&D programs.2  This shift in research funding has caused the federal 
government to find new ways of developing the technology necessary to keep the country 
competitive in global markets and secure from its enemies. 
With the new and ever-changing threats facing our nation today, the ability of the 
Navy to develop, identify, and transfer technology to the hands of Sailors and Marines is 
even more crucial now than ever before.  The Navy spends roughly $15 to $18 billion 
dollars each year on Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E).3  It funds 
its RDT&E through several programs that include government and private labs, schools 
and universities, and profit and not-for-profit companies.  These programs typically focus 
on military needs identified by the Navy to these groups.  But, is the Navy missing a 
portion of the R&D community that is developing technologies for the commercial sector 
that may prove to be useful to the Navy?  Is there a sector of emerging technology that 
 
1 Kei  Koizumi, "R&D Funding Trends in the US Government," American Association for the 
Advancement of Science (2005), 27 Oct. 2005 <http://www.aaas.org>. 
2 Ross  Armbrecht, "AAAS Report XXX: Research and Development FY06," American Association 
for the Advancement of Science (2005), 28 Oct. 2005 <http://www.aaas.gov>.  
3 "FY2006 Budget Estimates," Department of the Navy Office of Budget, Department of the Navy, 27 
Oct. 2005 <http://www.navweb.secnavy.navy.mil>.  
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the Navy is not aware of?  These questions are now being asked and the venture capital 
(VC) community has been identified as one possible source for insight into the emerging 
commercial technology market that may facilitate the Navy’s need for early awareness of 
technology. 
VC has become a hot topic throughout government.  There are several agencies, 
at all levels of government that are engaged with innovative companies in hopes of 
transferring useful technology to their organizations.  These technologies are being 
developed for the commercial market, but may have applications in the Navy.  There are 
several programs that the government and the Navy use to fund these initiatives such as 
Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR), Small Business Technology Transfer 
(STTR) and Cooperative Research and Development Agreements (CRADA).  In the last 
few years, the government has begun looking at other options for technology 
identification and transfer.  Within the last six years, two venture initiatives have been 
started: the Central Intelligence Agency’s In-Q-Tel and the U.S. Army’s OnPoint.   
In the late 1990s, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) found itself falling 
behind in technologies that were used in information gathering and management.  With 
the help of some forward-thinking executives, consultants, and a team of lawyers, the 
CIA established In-Q-Tel.  In-Q-Tel was charged with “accessing information technology 
expertise and technology wherever it exists and bringing it to bear on the information 
management challenges facing the CIA.”4  In 2002, the United States Army was funded 
to establish a venture capital initiative to “better collaborative ties with the young, small, 
growth-oriented companies that take risks and push innovation.”5  The Army decided to 
start its own private venture capital company called OnPoint.   
In 2003, Congress encouraged the Navy to conduct a study on “whether the Navy 
could benefit from establishing a pilot venture capital fund to enable program mangers to 
take advantage of higher risk technology developments in a rapid fashion without fear of 
 
4 Rick  Yannuzzi, "In-Q-tel: A New Partnership Between the CIA and the Private Sector," Defense 
Intelligence Journal (2000), 28 Oct. 2005 <http://www.cia.gov>.  
5 Jerry  Lewis, United States, Cong. House, Department of Defense and Emergency, 107 Cong., 2nd 
sess., 117, 10 Jan. 2002, 27 Oct. 2005 <http://www.thomas.loc.gov>.  
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penalty to their existing programs.”6  The Navy’s Commercial Technology Transition 
Office (CTTO) conducted a study and reported its findings to Congress in July 2003.  
Among other things, the report stated that there was some benefit to the Navy in 
interacting with the venture community to gain early awareness of emerging commercial 
technologies.   
Does interacting with the venture community require equity investments like the 
ones made by In-Q-tel and OnPoint?  How should the Navy design a program to engage 




This research draws upon the Department of the Navy’s (DoN) initiative to fund 
limited research and development projects with funds directed to VC firms as currently 
being studied by the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (FM&C) and the Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of the Navy (RDT&E).  The objective is to analyze the feasibility of investing 
in VC firms and if the research supports such investments, provide recommendations on 
how to employ the VC firms to maximize the benefit to the Navy. 
 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
The primary question considered in this research paper is:  Should the DoN invest 
research and development funds into VC firms as a way to gain access to emerging 
commercial technologies?   
To answer the primary question, the following secondary questions were 
addressed.  1) What has resulted from other government agencies’ investments in VC 
firms?  2) What are the costs associated with retaining or starting a VC firm?  3) Who is 
identifying the need for the technology and who is currently identifying the technology?  
 
6 Jerry  Lewis, United States, Cong. House, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, 107 Cong., 2nd sess., 
532, 25 June 2003, 27 Oct. 2005 <http://www.thomas.loc.gov>. 
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4) If it is determined that the DoN should invest in VC firms, how should the Navy carry 
out such investments?  5) Is it necessary for the Navy to make equity investments to gain 
access to technology?  6) What ethical considerations must be taken into account before 
investing in a VC firm? 
 
D. SCOPE OF THESIS 
 
This thesis provides an in-depth assessment as to whether the Department of the 
Navy should engage the VC community or not.  This was accomplished by looking at 
current government venture type programs and comparing their objectives with those of 
the Navy.  The research conducted on these programs was limited to DoD involvement.  
The research focused on gaining expert opinions from department officials, VC fund 
managers, and individuals in the business community.  It further examined the portfolio 
of the two government backed VC firms to determine the focus of their investments and 
the return on those investments.   
Once research was underway, it was determined that there were limited financial 
and historical data available on the two programs that most closely related to full VC 
engagement.  Unfortunately, this limited the scope of the thesis and did not allow for a 




The first step in the research was to conduct a literature review from books, 
professional journals, the internet, and other information sources in order to understand 
the current VC market and the industry in which it operates.  The second was to 
determine the Navy’s objectives for the venture community by interviewing senior DoN 
officials and government employees who have already had limited engagements with the 
VC community.  The third step was to determine the feasibility of the Navy’s engaging 
the VC community by interviewing business leaders, special interest groups, and 
 5
academics.  In addition, these interviews helped to define the ways in which the VC 
community would likely be willing to interact with the Navy.  Next, alternatives for 
engaging venture capitalists were determined.  To do this, different government venture 
programs were reviewed to examine how each program allowed or encouraged 
interaction with the venture community.  Finally, from the research conducted, a 
suggested course of action was determined.   
  
F. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
 
The organization of the study closely follows the methodology described above.  
Chapter II gives a broad overview of the VC community.  The objective of this section is 
to understand how the industry operates in order to better address the goals and 
involvement of the DoN in the VC industry. Chapter III addresses recent government 
programs that attempt to reach the highly innovative companies that VC firms are 
attracted to.  The section focuses on DoD involvement in these programs with the 
exception of the CIA’s program.  Chapter IV discusses possible options the Navy could 
undertake if it wishes to enter into or interact with the VC industry.  Chapter V states our 
recommendation for the Navy’s involvement in venture capital.  It also gives suggestions 
on how to structure, organize, and fund the initiative.  Chapter VI summarizes our 
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II. VENTURE CAPITAL OVERVIEW 
 
 This chapter will examine the VC industry and provide a brief overview of how 
VC firms in that industry operate.  The objective of this section is to understand how the 
industry operates in order to better address the goals and involvement of the Department 
of the Navy (DoN) in the VC industry. Specifically, this section will examine the 
following: 
• History and nature of the VC industry 
• Performance of VC firms 
• How VC firms are structured  
• How VC firms are compensated 
• How VC firms invest money 
• How VC firms use staged investments 
• How VC firms oversee firms they are managing  
• How VC firms terminate investments  
 This chapter is not intended to be an all-inclusive look into the VC community, 
but rather to serve as an overview of private sector involvement in VC. Later sections of 
the paper will focus on how the Navy should consider investments into VC. 
 
A. NATURE, HISTORY AND PERFORMANCE OF VC 
 
 VC is one possible solution for firms that are trying to raise money but do not 
have access to traditional financing methods, such as public markets or bank financing.  
Venture capitalists provide capital in exchange for partial ownership and management of 
the firm.  Venture capitalists serve not only as financiers to the companies in which they 
invest, but also as advisors, managers and most importantly, entrepreneurs.  Their goal is 
to make money for themselves and their investors. 
 While the current VC industry has been around in one form or another since 
World War II, it has been garnering attention only in the last 20 years.  The first true 
 8
                                                
American VC firm was American Research and Development (ARD) founded by MIT 
President Karl Compton and Harvard Business School Professor Georges F. Doriot in 
1946.  This firm made most of its profit by making a $70,000 investment in Digital 
Equipment Company in 1956 which eventually grew to a value of $355 million7.  Today, 
the VC industry is a powerful force and a major driver in the U.S. economy. 
 Estimates suggest that in 2003, the VC industry was directly responsible for over 
10 million jobs and $1.8 trillion in sales.  These numbers translate to approximately 9.4% 
of the total U.S. private sector employment and approximately 9.6% of private company 
sales.  These numbers become even more significant when considering that the VC 
industry has been responsible for less than two percent of the total equity investment over 
the past 34 years.8
 Even though VC constitutes a relatively small portion of the total equity 
investments, the VC industry has been growing.  This growth can be seen by looking at 
the number of VC firms in existence, the number of VC funds in existence or the total 
VC capital under management (Figure 1).9  This trend shows no signs of slowing down 
either based on the amount of new VC capital raised or total VC capital under 
management (Figure 2).10
 
7 Paul A. Gompers, and Joshua  Lerner, The Venture Capital Cycle, Cambridge Mass: MIT Press, 
1999. 
8 Venture Impact 2004, Arlington, VA: Global Insight, 2005, Venture Capital Benefits to the U.S. 
Economy, 28 July 2005 <http://www.nvca.org>. 
9 National Venture Capital Association Yearbook, New York: Thomson Venture Economics 
Information, 2005. 
10 Ibid. 
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Figure 1.   Growth in VC Industry 
 
 





















Figure 2.   VC Raised and Under Management 
    
 These numbers just tell the beginning of the story.  Recently, the VC industry has 
been attracting attention because VC backed companies have consistently outperformed 
non-VC backed companies.  In a recent study, Global Insights analyzed ten industry 
sectors in which VC firms invest11.  The VC investments in these sectors were compared 
against non-VC investments in the same sectors and analyzed for employment growth.  
Eight of the ten sectors showed growth and in every case the VC firms outperformed the 
non-VC backed firms.  In the two sectors where the VC firms did not show growth, they 
showed significantly less decline than the non-VC backed firms. The end result was that 
                                                 
11 Venture Impact 2004, Arlington, VA: Global Insight, 2005, Venture Capital Benefits to the U.S. 
Economy, 28 Jul. 2005 <http://www.nvca.org>.  
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between 2000 and 2003, employment at VC backed firms grew at an average rate of 
6.5% while total employment growth was down 2.3% (Figure 3).12
 This same study also analyzed sales growth at VC backed firms and compared the 
results to non-VC backed firms.  The study found that between 2000 and 2003, sales at 
VC backed firms grew at a rate of 11.6% while sales at non-VC back firms grew at a rate 
of 6.5%.  Again, in all ten sectors analyzed, the VC backed firms outperformed the non-
VC backed firms (Figure 4).13 VC investments also performed well when compared to 
public markets, consistently outperforming both the NASDAQ and S&P 500 when 


































































































Figure 3.   Employment Growth 2000-2003 
 
                                                 
12 Venture Impact 2004, Arlington, VA: Global Insight, 2005, Venture Capital Benefits to the U.S. 
Economy, 28 Jul. 2005 <http://www.nvca.org>.  
13 Ibid 





































































































Figure 4.   Sales Growth 2000-2003 
 

















































Figure 5.   5-Year Rolling Average Returns 
 
 While these figures are impressive to the public and generate attention for the VC 
industry, the Department of Defense’s (DoD) interest in the VC community does not 
revolve around sales growth or employment growth.  The driver of DoD’s interest in VC 
is the way VC spurs innovation in the form of new products for commercial markets.  In 
the same Global Insights study discussed above, it was found that when adjusted for the 
size of a firm, VC backed companies spend over twice as much on research and 
development (R&D) as non-VC backed firms.  To put this in perspective, the study found 
that in 1984, firms with fewer than 500 employees accounted for $4.4 billion (5.9%) of 
total U.S. R&D. In 2003, firms with less than 500 people contributed approximately 
 11
 12
                                                
$40.1 billion (20.7%) of the total U.S. R&D funding.   The study implies that much of 
this growth in R&D can be attributed to VC investments15. 
 Another study conducted by Dr. Josh Lerner and Dr. Samuel Kortun found that 
between 1983 and 1992, while VC funding averaged less than 3% of corporate R&D, it 
was responsible for approximate 8% of industrial innovations during the same period16.  
Clearly, it would seem that the VC industry creates efficiencies that cannot be found 
elsewhere.  
 
B. VENTURE CAPITAL FIRM STRUCTURE 
 
 It can be argued that many of the efficiencies for which VC firms are recognized 
stem from the way they are organized.  Again, a VC fund exists to make money for its 
investors and does this by investing in other companies, managing the companies, taking 
a portion of their earnings and then spinning off the companies.  In order to accomplish 
this series of events, a VC firm is usually structured as a limited partnership which has 
two types of partners that play a role in the fund.  These two types of partners are general 
partners and limited partners.17
 General partners are responsible for the daily management of the VC fund.  They 
assume all of the liability for the debt of the fund, hold board seats in the firms they 
invest in, and are responsible for turning a profit.  A limited partner is an investor in the 
fund who puts up money, but is not involved in the daily operation of the funds.  In some 
cases, limited partners can take seats as observers on the boards of the companies in 
which the VC firms invest, but must be careful not to get involved in the firm’s 
operations if they wish to retain their limited liability position.18
 
15 National Venture Capital Association Yearbook, New York: Thomson Venture Economics 
Information, 2005. 
16 Samuel Kortum, and Josh  Lerner, "Assessing the contribution of Venture Capital to Innovation," 
Rand Journal of Economics (2000), 28 Oct. 2005 <http://www.rje.org>.  




                                                
 In order to manage the relationships between the general partners and the limited 
partners, a VC firm must establish covenants at its inception which limit and guide the 
behavior of the fund and its partners.  Gompers and Lerner identify 14 classes of 
covenants which are used to manage a VC firm.19  We will not go into detail regarding 
the 14 classes of covenants, however it is important to briefly address the role of 
covenants in a VC fund because it is something the Navy will need to consider prior to 
deciding whether to invest in VC.  As such, we will briefly cover three groups of 
covenants that Gompers and Lerner identify as being crucial to a VC fund. 
 The first group that must be considered are covenants relating to a fund’s 
management.  These types of covenants can place limits on the amount of money a fund 
can invest, limit the use of debt and equity financing, and limit co-investments with other 
venture funds.  Like most covenants, those that relate to a fund’s management are 
designed to protect the limited partners by placing restrictions on what the general 
partners can and cannot do.  Since the limited partners are not involved in a fund’s daily 
operations, they must rely on these management covenants to limit the fund’s risk.20
 The second group of covenants that Gompers and Lerner identify are covenants 
that relate to the activities of the general partners.  These covenants can include limits on 
the number of general partners, the size of personal investments by the general partners in 
the fund, in addition to restricting the general partners’ ability to sell their portion of the 
investment and the VC’s fundraising activities (which can increase a fund’s management 
fee).  Like the management covenants, these covenants are designed to protect the limited 
partners against risk of exposure as the result of the general partners’ actions.21  
 The final group of covenants that Gompers and Lerner identify are covenants 
which restrict the types of investments a VC fund can make.  Examples of these types of 
covenants can include limits on the class of investments that can be made (such as public 
securities) or limits on the percentage of investments that can be made into a specific type 
of investment.  Like the previous two classes of covenants, these covenants are designed 
 





                                                
to protect the limited partners from the general partners’ actions by aligning the general 
partners’ investments to the type that the limited partners wish to make.    
 
C. VENTURE CAPITAL COMPENSATION 
 
 As with most industries, financial compensation is the main incentive mechanism 
that limited partners in VC firms have to control the actions of the general partners.  
When a VC firm is established, the compensation plan will be clearly defined in the 
original partnership agreement.  For a VC firm, the compensation plan will normally 
specify a set percentage of the fund’s capital to be paid to the general partners as a 
management fee and include a provision to give the management a percentage of the 
fund’s earnings called a “carry.”22  Over the life of a typical VC fund, the net present 
value (NPV) of the management fees ranges from 7% to 18% of capital raised, while the 
carry is normally valued from 12.5% to 30% of the fund’s profit.23   
 The typical compensation plan normally centers on what is called the 2/20 plan.  
This type of plan means that the general partners receive a yearly management fee of 2% 
of the fund’s capital plus 20% of any profit the fund generates.  While there are no firm 
data to support this compensation plan as the industry standard, the numbers came up in 
numerous interviews with venture capitalists who act as general partners.24  Gompers and 
Lerner also note that the average VC general manager receives a management fee of 
2.5% in addition to 20% of the earnings.  As a result of all of this, we feel that 2/20 
represents a good figure for an industry compensation approximation.25
 More important than the 2/20 number is the way the compensation plan can be 
used to motivate the fund’s general partners’ behavior and the way that it can attract 
 
22 Karthic Jayaraman, personal interview, 18 Jun 2005. 
23 Kate  Litvak, "Venture Capital Limited Partnership Agreements:  Understanding Compensation 
Arrangements," Columbia Law School and Economics Working Paper No. 254 (2004), 29 Oct. 2005 
<http://law.utexas.edu/law>. 
24 Based on interviews conducted with Mr. Howard Strateman, Mr. Karthic Jayaraman and Mr. Jason 
Rottenberg. 
25 Paul A. Gompers, and Joshua  Lerner, The Venture Capital Cycle, Cambridge Mass: MIT Press, 
1999. 
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general partners.  Gompers and Lerner note that “leading venture capitalists may be able 
to extract a higher pay than their less seasoned counterparts because investors want to 
invest in their next fund.”26  This means that experience in the VC community seems to 
matter and that greater experience entails higher compensation. 
 This point is especially relevant in today’s VC community.  Many researchers feel 
that the success of the VC community has attracted many new entrants who may not have 
the experience required to properly manage a fund.  Gompers and Lerner suggest that 
newcomers to the industry are no better at predicting their investment ability than the 
investor (limited partners).27  As such, if venture capitalists do not have established 
reputations, they cannot set their own price and must be price takers, accepting below 
average management and compensation fees upon start-up.  This view is consistent with 
the above view that a successful reputation may allow the venture capitalist to command 
a premium over the rest of the market. 
 Another recently published paper by Gompers and others has also highlighted this 
point and seems to validate Gompers’ earlier assumptions in The Venture Capital Cycle.  
Specifically, in the working paper titled Venture Capital Investment Cycles: the Impact of 
Public Markets, the authors acknowledge that “industry specific human capital is an 
important channel though which experience influences the reactions of venture capital 
firms to shift public market signals.”  The paper goes on to state that “the venture capital 
industry is driven mostly by the more successful venture firms, that is, those with the 
most experience.”28  This view also means that the experienced venture capitalists seem 
to lead their industry and that the inexperienced venture capitalists follow the 
experienced.  Simply stated, it seems that experience drives the industry and that prior to 
investing in VC, it is beneficial to have experience on your side. 
 While Gompers’ research on VC compensation is well accepted, a recently 
published paper discussing the compensation arrangements in more detail also is worth 
 
26 Paul A. Gompers and Joshua  Lerner, The Venture Capital Cycle, Cambridge Mass: MIT Press, 
1999. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Paul  Gompers, Anna  Kovner, Josh  Lerner,  and David  Scharfstein, "Venture Capital Investment 
Cycles:  The Impact of Public Markets," National Bureau of Economic Research (2005), 29 July 2005 
<http://www.nber.org>.  
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noting.  In a paper titled, Venture Capital Limited Partnership Agreements: 
Understanding Compensation Arrangements, Kate Litvak expands on some of Gompers 
research on VC compensation.  Litvak finds that while in general “better venture 
capitalists earn higher overall compensation” she also finds that management fees decline 
as a percentage of fund size when the fund size increases, management fees and carry 
move in the same direction and that top venture capitalists do indeed charge more for 
their services.29
 To discuss her findings in more detail, Litvak identifies four main methods of 
management compensation that venture capitalists use to charge for their services.  The 
first method is a flat management fee based on a percentage of committed capital.  This 
means that a venture capitalist will receive a fixed percentage of money based on the 
investments made.  The second method is the declining fee based on a declining 
percentage of committed capital.  This system is similar to the previous system with the 
exception that the fee decreases with time, most likely because committed capital 
increases with time.30
 The third method is a declining fee based on a combination of committed capital 
and managed capital.  This plan differs from the previous two because it also considers 
managed capital.  In the previous plans, the management fee was based on committed 
capital and neglected the capital that the fund managed but had not yet committed. The 
fourth method is a fee based on managed capital.  Although this method is mentioned in 
the paper, Litvak found no firms that actively used it. 
 
D. OVERVIEW OF VENTURE CAPITAL INVESTING 
 
 As stated in the beginning of this section, small firms turn to VC as a way to 
secure funding when traditional means such as banks are not feasible.  Gompers and 
 
29 Kate  Litvak, "Venture Capital Limited Partnership Agreements:  Understanding Compensation 




                                                
Lerner identify four critical factors that may limit a small firm’s ability to get access to 
capital.31
1. uncertainty 
2. asymmetric information 
3. nature of a firm’s assets 
4. condition of relative financial and product markets 
 In the DoN context, these four factors may, at first, seem insignificant.    We feel 
that these four traits, while not significant to the Navy from a financing perspective, are 
significant to the government as proxies for risks that are inherent to the VC community. 
 The first factor that can lead a small firm to seek VC backing is uncertainty in the 
product it is developing.  This uncertainty could include the technology, rival firms, or 
product placement.  The inherent risk that the uncertainty brings will require the firm 
seeking the VC backing to forgo a significant portion of the possible returns in the form 
of compensation to the VC firm.32   
 The second factor is the small firm’s or entrepreneur’s asymmetric information.  
In this sense, Gompers and Lerner refer to asymmetric information as information that 
the entrepreneur knows but may not disclose to the investor.  The concern is that the 
entrepreneur is making decisions that the investors do not know about or are uninformed 
about.  The threat of an entrepreneur using asymmetric information may prevent them 
from receiving capital from traditional sources.33
 The third factor is the nature of a firm’s assets.34  If a firm has tangible assets, it 
may be easier for it to secure financing because its collateral can be put up against the 
loan.  Small firms that are backed by VC do not usually have the assets to put up for 
collateral and as such, find traditional financing difficult. 
 The final factor identified is the market conditions that the entrepreneur is facing.  
These market conditions include not only conditions within the capital markets, but also 
 





                                                
within the product markets as well.  Gompers and Lerner state that many times in capital 
markets, the cost of capital and the supply of capital make it impossible for a small firm 
to get access to the capital.  Along with this argument, our research conducted by 
interviewing venture capitalists suggests that in many instances, the capital markets 
which provide traditional financing do not recognize the potential profitability of the 
small firms and do not take the time to research the product markets.35
 Analysis of these factors suggests that small firms turn to VC as a way to secure 
capital because in many cases, the firms are deemed too risky for traditional sources of 
financing.  When a firm secures financing from VC, it forgoes a portion of ownership to 
the VC firm and also loses the autonomy that many traditional financing avenues would 
have provided.  By accepting VC backing, a firm is accepting a new management partner. 
 The other side to this argument is that VC firms provide financing to these firms.  
If VC firms are providing financing, they must see something that the traditional sources 
of financing do not.  Here, research suggests that the difference is the level of 
involvement that a VC firm takes in its investments.36
 Before investing in a firm, the venture capitalist will have to carefully analyze the 
business plan.  If the VC firm sees a prospect of success, then it will provide financing in 
exchange for part ownership of the firm.  Along with this ownership comes the ability to 
shape the direction of the firm through management, which is normally done by 
accepting a seat on the board of directors.37  A study done in 1989 by Gorman and 
Sahlman show this unique management relationship at work.  In their study, Gorman and 
Sahlman found that between financing rounds, the lead venture capitalist will normally 
visit the VC backed firm once a month and spend between four to five hours with them 
during that visit.  They also found that the non-lead venture capitalist will normally visit 
the VC backed firm once per quarter and that visit will normally last for between two to 
 
35 Howard Strateman, personal interview, 18 June 2005 
36 Jason Rottenberg, personal interview, June 2005. 
37 Ibid. 
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three hours.38  This shows that VC firms have a level of knowledge and understanding 
that may provide them with unique insight into their investment’s potential. 
 Another unique feature of VC investments is that the general partners of a VC 
firm know they are not going to get the returns commensurate with the risk on most of 
the investments they make.  VC funds accept risk in exchange for the possibility of larger 
returns, knowing full well that all of their investments will not pay off.  Again, the VC 
community is unique because VC firms leverage off each other.  Many times, a VC 
backed firm will put up a portion of the total financing required along with other VC 
funds.  This provides two benefits.  First, it allows the VC firm to have insight into the 
industry and learn about the firm’s business.  Second, it allows the VC firm to make 
many more investments and spread around its risk.39
 It is also not unusual for a VC fund to invest in competing technologies because 
in the end, the VC firm assumes that one of the technologies will pay off.  Investing in 
competing technologies also allows the VC fund to merge different firms with competing 
technologies in its portfolio when it has identified which one will be the “winner.”40  In 
the end, the choice to use VC funds is about risk exposure and risk mitigation. 
 
E. STAGED INVESTMENTS 
 
 While it may not seem initially obvious, venture capitalists are in the business of 
risk management for the limited liability partners.  In the previous pages, we addressed 
why entrepreneurs turn to VC firms as a means to get capital for their projects.  Simply 
put, entrepreneurs turn to VC firms because in most cases, new start ups with unproven 





38 Paul A. Gompers, and Joshua  Lerner, The Venture Capital Cycle, Cambridge Mass: MIT P, 1999.  
 
39 Steven Mendel, personal interview, 25 July 2005.  
40 Ibid. 
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understand this risk better than anyone and have developed tools to mitigate this risk.  
One of the most powerful tools the venture capitalist has is the ability to stage 
investments.41
 Staging investments means that the venture capitalist will not invest all of the 
required capital at once but instead, will do it incrementally, on an as-needed basis.  With 
respect to risk mitigation, Gompers and Lerner note that the use of staged investments 
solves the two basic problems inherent in any VC endeavor, the principal-agent problem 
and entrepreneur asymmetric information.42
 The principal-agent problem, addressed by agency theory, refers to the concept 
that the agents, or entrepreneurs, will not always act in the best interest of the investors or 
venture capitalists, who are the principals.  While this may initially seem counterintuitive, 
research over the past 30 years indicates that the agents will not always maximize value 
to the shareholders.43  To a venture capitalist, this could mean that the entrepreneur may 
not make the best use of the investments made by a VC firm.    
 Staged investments help solve this problem because they allow the venture 
capitalists to check for progress before making additional investments.  If the venture 
capitalists do not like what they see, they can refuse to fund the project until their needs 
are met.  Once the venture capitalists see progress, they will resume funding.  
Conceptually, this process can be compared to the milestone decision points under typical 
DoD acquisition contracts.  In the DoD system, research and development programs must 
meet certain milestone criteria to continue to be funded.  These criteria include 
measurements on efficiency, funding, technology development and feasibility, and 
management, just to name a few.   
 The second reason, according to Gompers and Lerner, that VC firms use staged 
investments is to counter any asymmetric information that the entrepreneur may have.  
The reason behind this is not much different than agency theory.  When a venture 
 
41 Paul A. Gompers, and Joshua  Lerner, The Venture Capital Cycle, Cambridge Mass: MIT Press, 
1999. 
42 Ibid 
43 Richard A. Brealey, and Stewart C. Myers, Principles of corporate finance, 7th ed., Boston, Mass: 
McGraw-Hill/Irwin, 2003. 
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capitalist makes an investment in a new company, the entrepreneur knows much more 
about the product than the venture capitalist.  The entrepreneur may know that there is a 
better technology out there coming to market that the venture capitalist does not know 
about.  Even though the entrepreneur knows this, he/she may still try to extract money 
from the venture capitalist to support a project that may not result in the return the 
venture capitalist expects.  Staged funding helps solve this problem because it allows the 
venture capitalist to learn about the technology, the industry and the competition as time 
goes on before investing too much money in a project that has a low or negative net 
present value (NPV).44
 While Gompers and Lerner have received much support for their ideas with 
respect to the reasons for staged financing, there is another paper that we feel also 
highlights an important use of staged financing.  Darwin V. Neher notes in a paper 
published in 1999 that staged financing’s main use is to allow the venture capitalists to 
control the assets in their investments.45  The main difference in Neher’s view is that 
staged financing adjusts to reflect the value of the different assets to the investor.  At the 
beginning of a VC investment, Neher argues that there are normally very few tangible 
assets that the venture capitalist can recover from an investment.  As such, the main asset 
at the early stage is human capital in the form of the entrepreneur.  Staged investments in 
a firm give the venture capitalist a lever of control over the assets.  As the firm grows and 
matures, more tangible assets exist for a venture capitalist to use and less emphasis is 
placed on the human capital.46
 Neher’s view on staged financing can be reconciled with Gompers and Lerner’s 
views on staged financing.  Neher notes that each new stage of financing should coincide 
with some significant development in the firm or its product.  At each new stage, Neher 
notes that some of the project’s ambiguity is removed (through revised NPV assessments 
and tangible assets than can be used by the venture capitalist) and that justifies more 
 
44 Paul A. Gompers, and Joshua  Lerner, The Venture Capital Cycle, Cambridge Mass: MIT Press, 
1999.  
45 Darwin V. Neher, "Staged Financing: An Agency Perspective," Review of Economic Studies  1999.  
46 Ibid. 
money being infused.47  Gompers and Lerner note that firms with higher R&D and a 
lower ratio of tangible assets receive more rounds of financing.  Firms with lower R&D 
but more tangible assets receive fewer staged investments.48  This suggests that the 
tangible assets reduce the venture capitalist‘s concern over the investment’s ambiguity 
because the assets provide a means to recover some of the capital invested. 
 With the reasons for staged financing established, we will now briefly look at the 
different stages of financing that VC firms use.  Figure 6 shows a summary of 794 
venture backed firms that Gompers and Lerner analyzed to study staged financing.49  The 
conclusion from this is that there seems to be a trend of later stages receiving more 
funding.  We believe that this can be traced to the reasons identified above.  As time goes 
on, the ambiguity of the investment seems to be lessened.  Gompers and Lerner note that 













































































Figure 6.   VC Funding Levels by Stage 
 
                                                 
47 Darwin V. Neher, "Staged Financing: An Agency Perspective," Review of Economic Studies  1999. 
48 Paul A. Gompers, and Joshua  Lerner, The Venture Capital Cycle, Cambridge Mass: MIT P, 1999.  
49 This chart was compiled based on data presented in The Venture Capital Cycle on page 155. All 
information was compiled and analyzed by Paul Gompers and Josh Lerner.  This chart is simply a graphical 
representation of their findings. 
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 This should come as no surprise because it is when firms go public that venture 
capitalists make most of their profit.  The ultimate goal of a venture capitalist is to take a 
firm public, and reap the benefits.  This will normally require more investments and, as 
the technology or product become more defined; the venture capitalist will increase the 
funding because the business plan has become more certain.  If, on the other hand, it is 
determined that the product being developed is not going to be successful, the venture 
capitalist will not make any later stage investments and instead, will focus on exiting the 
investment.   
 
F. VENTURE CAPITALIST OVERSIGHT OF INVESTMENTS 
 
 Up to this point, we have mainly discussed the role of venture capitalists as 
investors in funds while only briefly touching on their role as active participants in the 
funds they invest in.  VC involvement is commonly considered to be a cash infusion into 
a firm.  This is an oversimplification since VC firms become active participants in the 
funds they manage.  Our analysis suggests that venture capitalists are specific to certain 
industries in that once they have made investments in the industry, they become 
knowledgeable about the industry and can reduce information asymmetries.    
 Unlike traditional types of financing methods that are available, VC is unique 
because of the involvement of the general partners in their investments.  To the venture 
capitalists that are making the investments, the risk they assume provides the justification 
for their involvement.  The fact that there is a demand for, and supply of VC money 
seems to provide validation that not only do the investors think the system works well, 
but the entrepreneurs are willing to forgo ownership and autonomy in the hope of making 
a profit.  Aside from the cash infusions that a venture capitalist makes into a firm, 
investors also must consider the cost to oversee the investments that the venture 
capitalists make. 
 When a venture capitalist makes an investment in a firm, that investment usually 
buys the venture capitalist a seat on the board.  It is from this position that the venture 
capitalist provides the oversight to the firm.  Even though the venture capitalists made an  
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investment, they still incur substantial costs as a result of the board seat.  One of the 
biggest costs that Gompers and Lerner identify are the transaction costs associated with 
maintaining the seat.51  
 Many of these transactions costs seem to stem from travel related expenses.  As a 
result, it is not unusual to find VCs located close to their investments.  In a study 
Gompers and Lerner conducted, it was found that over half of the VC backed firms 
analyzed had a venture representative within 60 miles of their investments.52  This can be 
important because many industries are centered around a specific geographic location, as 
are VC firms. 
 California has, by far, the highest percentage of VC backed firms.  In 2003, it is 
estimated that almost 2.5 million people in the state worked for a VC backed company.  
Texas was a distant second with an estimated 900,000 people employed by VC backed 
firms, with Massachusetts ranking number three with a little over 700,000 people 
employed by VC backed firms.53
 The geographic location of VC firms plays a huge role in the degree of 
involvement because while the general partners can (and should) be located close to the 
action, the limited partners do not need to be geographically as close. As a potential 
investor in VC, it is important for the Navy to understand the relationship between the 
venture capitalist firm and its investments.  The VC general partners are the middle men 
in the chain that has the entrepreneur at one end and the limited partners (e.g. the Navy) 
on the other.  The limited partners allow the general partners to invest the money and 
then, later, the general partners will report back to the limited partners on the progress 
and distribute returns, (if any).  As a limited partner, the investor who supplies the 
venture capitalist with money is usually not an active participant in the investment.  
Based on how the VC firm is structured, the investor can inform the general partners 
about how much they want to know about the investments, but the general partners are 
the ones providing the oversight. 
 
51 Paul A. Gompers, and Joshua  Lerner, The Venture Capital Cycle, Cambridge Mass: MIT P, 1999.  
52 Ibid 
53 Venture Impact 2004, Arlington, VA: Global Insight, 2005, Venture Capital Benefits to the U.S. 
Economy, 28 July 2005 <http://www.nvca.org>. 
G. EXITING VC INVESTMENTS 
 
 As we have previously stated, venture capitalists are in the business to make 
money for themselves and their partners.  The investments that they make are the 
vehicles which allow them to make a return. The best way for the venture capitalists to 
make a profit is to take their investments public, which is often when the venture 
capitalist exit the investment, and distribute the returns to the investors.54
 On average, the typical private equity fund is liquidated after about a ten year life. 
This implies that a venture capitalist will only invest in a company if he or she thinks that 
can be developed or sold within a period of less than ten years.55  While this ten year 
figure is an average across numerous industries, it is important in the sense that it shows 
that VC funds do indeed, have a finite life, and that no VC investment is started without 
an exit strategy being considered. 
 Recent data from 2004 show that different sectors also have different average life 
spans.  As should be expected, higher technology sectors have shorter life spans. The 
chart below (Figure 7) summarizes the data across VC industry sectors for 2004.   


























































































Figure 7.   Average and Median Age in Months of 2004 IPOs 
                                                 
54 Karthic Jayaraman, personal interview, 18 June 2005.  
55 Paul A. Gompers, and Joshua  Lerner, The Venture Capital Cycle, Cambridge Mass: MIT P, 1999.  
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 While it is impossible to generalize why and when a venture capitalist will take a 
firm public, Gompers and Lerner identify two major factors that affect a decision to exit a 
profitable investment: 
1. Market Conditions at the Initial Public Offering (IPO) 
2. Reputation of the VC firm presenting the IPO. 
 Market conditions are arguably the most important factor in taking a firm public 
because the value of the investment is dependent on the public’s perception of the firm’s 
value.  Gompers and Lerner’s research indicates those experienced venture capitalists are 
better able to time an IPO to the correct market conditions.56  The second condition that 
Gompers and Lerner identify is the reputation of the VC firm.  While this initially may 
seem rather insignificant, it turns out to be a major factor in a venture capitalist’s decision 
to take an investment public.   
 There are two reasons for this.  First, as we have identified earlier in this paper, 
the experience level of a venture capitalist does indeed matter.  As a result, Gompers and 
Lerner suggest that younger, more inexperienced venture capitalists may try to exit an 
investment before the optimal exit time as a way to signal other investors of their 
success.57  The reasoning behind this is actually somewhat complex and deals with the 
life of a VC fund. 
 As previously discussed, the life of a VC fund rarely exceeds ten years.  This limit 
means that a venture capitalist will normally start another fund every few years as a way 
to always have investment opportunities.  The lifespan of a VC fund also means that 
rarely are any more investments made after the fund has existed for five years.  It is at 
this point that a venture capitalist will start looking to raise a new fund.  When raising a 
new fund, the venture capitalist will need to demonstrate success so that he/she may exit 
investments prior to the maturity to show capital appreciation to potential investors.  
Gompers calls this “grandstanding” and this is something that can affect the decision to 
exit a profitable investment before the investment is fully mature.58
 





                                                
 While market conditions and “grandstanding” are two factors to consider when an 
investment appreciates, not all investments appreciate.  Based on interviews conducted, it 
does not seem unusual to have only two to five percent of investments pay off with the 
returns commensurate with the risk taken.59  That leads to the question of what to do with 
investments that do not appreciate as expected.  Normally they are not taken public but 
the venture capitalists still must exit these investments. 
 This is again an area where industry knowledge can pay off for a venture 
capitalist.  We have already established that VC funds do not put all of their eggs in one 
basket, but most do not diversify across sectors.  If a venture capitalist knows that there is 
a promising technology in a given industry sector, but is not sure which one will succeed, 
the venture capitalist will normally place investments on numerous competing 
technologies.60  The venture capitalist knows that one of the technologies will eventually 
win out but at the early stages does not know which one.  After a few years of operating 
the fund, the venture capitalist will have a better idea as to which technology has the best 
chance for success and the venture capitalist can then place additional investments into 
the expected “winner”.  It is at this point where the venture capitalist has some options 
with the “losers”.   
 The first thing that a venture capitalist can do with a loser is to simply pull 
funding and close the company down.  The money invested can be considered a sunk 
cost.  While the money invested in the closed company was not a profitable investment, 
in most cases, the venture capitalist should have been able to gain industry exposure. The 
second option that a venture capitalist firm can exercise is to fold the unprofitable firm 
into one of its more profitable investments in a competing technology.  While it may 
seem counterintuitive to invest in a competing technology, the venture capitalists need to 
manage risk and one tool for this is to invest in competing technologies. By investing in 
competing technologies, risk is mitigated by ensuring you pick the winner.  However, the 
return is lower because the high return on the winner is offset by the lower return on the 
loser.  The assets of the unsuccessful firm can normally be put to use in another of the 
 
59 Karthic Jayarman, personal interview, 25 July 2005 and Howard Strateman, personal interview 25 
July 2005. 
60 Steven Mendel, personal interview, 25 July 2005. 
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venture capitalist’s investments.  The third option is to spin the investment off to another 
venture capitalist who may be able to benefit from the technology or expand on the 
research.61
 When considering exiting investments, it is important to remember that most 
investments that a VC fund makes will not generate the returns commensurate with the 
risk taken.  As a result, the VC fund will have to divest itself of many investments that 
are not profitable.  While these investments did not return a monetary profit, they 
hopefully provided the venture capitalists with industry insight to help them make better 
investment decisions in the future.  
 When considering the profitable investments, the venture capitalist fund will also 
have to consider how to divest himself or herself  from these investments as well.  When 
exiting profitable investments, the venture capitalist’s major consideration will need to be 
the market because the public will be the ones valuing the firm.  Secondary 
considerations that the investors need to consider are the venture capitalist’s reputation 
and timing of the IPO. 
 
 
61 Karthic Jayarman, personal interview, 25 July 2005 and Howard Strateman, personal interview 25 
July 2005. 
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III. GOVERNMENT VENTURE CAPITAL INITIATIVES 
 This chapter of the paper will address recent government forays into the VC 
community.  Most of this chapter will be limited to DoD involvement in VC with the 
exception of the CIA’s program and certain aspects of the Small Business Innovation 
Research (SBIR) program.  Specifically, this chapter will address the following: 
• CTTO – U.S. Navy’s Commercial Technology Transition Office 
• CRADA – Cooperative Research and Development Agreement 
• SBIR – Small Business Innovation Research 
• In-Q-Tel – Central Intelligence Agency’s VC program  
• OnPoint – U.S. Army’s VC program 
 Over the past few years, VC has been a hot topic in DoD circles.  As a result, 
there seems to be a new VC project coming about every few months, to include this 
paper.  The numerous VC programs currently in development or in progress make 
analyzing all of the programs well beyond the scope of this paper due to time constraints.  
As a result, the six programs listed above represent what we feel are the best examples of 
VC models which could provide the most benefit to the Navy.  The purpose of this 
chapter is not to recommend an alternative to the Navy, but rather to inform the reader of 
what we feel are successful models.   
 
A. U.S. NAVY COMMERCIAL TECHNOLOGY TRANSITION OFFICE 
(CTTO) OVERVIEW62
 
 The Commercial Technology Transition Office was established in 1999 by the 
Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development and Acquisition) as a way to 
quickly insert commercial technology into the DoN to meet urgent needs.  Since its 
inception, CTTO has brokered over 57 technology transition deals totaling $212 million 
that either expanded naval capabilities or reduced total ownership costs of current 
 
62 WindyJoy Springs, personal interview, May 2005.  
All data on the CTTO comes from interviews conducted with Ms. WindyJoy Springs or the CTTO’s 
webpage.  The below graphic is adopted from the DoD FMR 5000 series. 
programs.  In addition to the technology transition, CTTO has also interfaced with the 
VC community, provided independent system oriented technology assessments, aided the 
DoN on technology insertion strategies and evaluated disruptive technology. 
 While the CTTO has a large mission, for the purposes of this paper, we will focus 
on its ability to transition technology into the Navy since that is one of the reasons the 
Navy is interested in VC.  The CTTO specifically looks for technology that meets the 
requirements to be classified at Technology Readiness Level (TRL) of 6 or greater. 63  
This means that the technology being evaluated must be at least a prototype that has been 
tested in an operational environment.  (A summary of TRLs are provided in Table 1) 
 
 
Table 1. Technology Readiness Levels64 
 
 When looking for technology, the CTTO narrows its search to focus on 
technology that will either increase the DoN capabilities or provide considerable cost 
savings to the DoN.  CTTO identifies this technology by accepting proposals from the 
Program Executive Offices (PEOs)/ System Commands (SYSCOMS) and then 
distributing the requirements though data calls at DoDtechmatch.com.  
DoDtechmatch.com is a website designed to facilitate information flow between DoD 
activities and industry.  Before evaluating any technology proposals in depth, the CTTO 
must have creditable information about the company’s projects.  Once the credibility has 
                                                 
63 TRLs are stages of a product’s development that correspond to its readiness for use 
64 Graphic from CTTO Website: http://www.onr.navy.mil/ctto/naval_needs.asp 
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been established, the CTTO acts as a matchmaker between the PEOs / SYSCOMS and 
the commercial sector.  Figure 8 illustrates this process.65
 
Figure 8.   CTTO Deal Process 
 
  
When the CTTO is acting as a matchmaker, many of the technologies it identifies 
are not considered ready-to-field products that have been proven though actual 
operational use.  Because of this, the CTTO may be required to provide additional R&D 
funding to allow the technology to be integrated into the Navy.  When additional funding 
is required, the CTTO will establish a Memorandum of Agreement which is signed by the 
PEO / SYSCOM, the Resource Sponsor and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy 
(RDT&E). This memo verifies the cost, schedule performance and risk of the project.  
When this is completed, funding will be provided to the program manager to allow the 
deal to be executed.  Typical deals are funded between $500,000 and $2,000,000. 
 While the CTTO’s mission has expanded since its inception, its funding has not.  
During its first year of operation (FY99), the CTTO was funded at approximately $5 
million and had approximately 12 people working in the office.  In FY01, the funding 
was reduced to approximately $4 million and the number of employees was reduced to 
eight.  In 2003, the FY04 budget was again reduced, to approximately $1 million, and the 
number of personnel was reduced to four.66  The significant funding reductions have 
drastically reduced the CTTO’s ability to accomplish its mission and have eliminated one 
of the CTTO’s best tools for engaging with the VC community: the VCs@Sea program.   
                                                 
65 Graphic from CTTO Website:  http://www.onr.navy.mil/ctto/mission.asp 
66 WindyJoy Springs, personal interview, August 2005 
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1. VCs@Sea Program 
 
 The VCs@Sea program was one way the CTTO was able to interact with the VC 
community.  The first of these events was held between 19 – 21 January 2003.  Under 
this program, the CTTO flew a group of venture capitalists to the USS NIMITZ (CVN 
65) aboard a C-2A Greyhound to observe firsthand how the Navy operates.  The program 
included a “trap” or landing on the carrier and a “cat shot” or take off from the carrier in 
addition to letting the venture capitalists see a fleet command center in operation.  The 
overall goal was to allow the venture capitalists to see “commercial uses for Naval 
intellectual property and spin-ins to bring commercial technology to the Navy and Marine 
Corps.”67  
 What was noteworthy about the VCs@Sea program is that it provided a reason for 
the VC community to start a dialogue with the Navy.  The ability for the investors, who 
were looking for a market for their projects, to see possible naval applications was a 
unique way of doing business.  Historically, the Navy would submit a request for a 
capabilities gap which needed to be met.  The VCs@Sea program approached this 
problem differently by inviting people to the fleet and asking “How can your company 
help us do our job better?”  This was a significant change from the way business was 
normally conducted and was a new way to start dialogue with the VC community. 
 
2. Navy Research Advisory Committee (NRAC) Venture Capital Panel 
 
 In addition to the VCs@Sea program, the CTTO was also the sponsor of the Navy 
Research Advisory Committee (NRAC) Venture Capital Technology Panel.  The NRAC 
VC Panel was to meet semiannually and to exist for a two year period.  The objective was 
to identify emerging technologies that the Department of the Navy should incorporate 




67 "Venture Capitalists at Sea," Office of Naval Resarch Media Area, 5 Feb. 2003, Department of the 
Navy, 19 Aug. 2005 <http://www.onr.navy.mil>.  
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capitalists.  The NRAC VC Panel was a formal mechanism that allowed the Navy to 
identify technology instead of establishing a VC fund such as the CIA’s In-Q-Tel or the 
Army’s OnPoint funds.   
 Conceptually, the NRAC VC panel fit nicely into the CTTO’s objectives of 
identifying up and coming technology.  Whereas VC funds such as OnPoint and In-Q-Tel 
invest heavily into specific technologies to identify a “winner”, the CTTO’s objective 
was one of awareness.  They were less concerned about which individual firm’s 
technology would prevail but instead, about what firms were developing what 
technology.  This information was then incorporated into the Navy’s technology strategy.  
 This, coupled with the VC@Sea Program, demonstrates an important use of VC 
to DoN: technology awareness.  The CTTO established a system that does not invest in 
companies, but provides funding for technologies that it identified as meeting a DoN 
need.  CTTO has targeted VC firms because of their success in demonstrating and 
fielding new technologies. 
 
B. COOPERATIVE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENT 
(CRADA) PROGRAM 
 
 CRADAs are legal agreements between a federal laboratory and a non-federal 
laboratory that permit both parties to conduct research or develop programs that are in 
keeping with the federal laboratory’s mission.68  CRADAs are authorized as a result of 
the federal Technology Transfer Act of 1986 which permits Government operated federal 
laboratories to enter into CRADAs with other agencies, be it federal, state, or local 
governments, private industry, public and private foundations, not for profit 
organizations, consortiums, foreign organizations or other persons.69  The goal of a 
CRADA is to allow a federal laboratory the opportunity to work with the public sector as 
 
68 United States, US House of Represenatives, Title 15 United States Code 3710a(d)(1), Washington, 
DC, 2005.  
69 Don  Fuqua, United States, Cong. House, Federal Technology Transfer Act of 1986, 99th Cong., 
HR 3773, 20 Oct. 1986, 15 Aug. 2005 <http://www.thomas.loc.gov>. 
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a means to turn government technology into commercial products70.  CRADAs can also 
be used to turn commercial technology into viable products for the federal government. 
 Like VC firms, CRADAs use the principal of leverage as a means to increase 
resources to solve a problem.  With CRADAs, the non-federal partners have the 
opportunity to leverage themselves with the federal government.  Either side can 
contribute personnel, services, equipment, funds, intellectual property or other resources 
that are required.71  While CRADAs allow for joint development of programs, they are 
not procurement contracts and as such, are not affected by the Federal Acquisition 
Regulations (FARs).72
  
1. CRADAs as a Means of Technology Transfer 
 
 Even though CRADAs are designed as a tool to allow the private sector to have 
access to the federal government’s research programs, we feel the biggest benefit of 
CRADAs to the Navy is the ability to have access to commercial technology.  In this 
sense, CRADAs can be powerful tools to allow the Navy to see what the commercial 
sector is developing and then share in the technology.  CRADAs can also have a much 
broader scope than a direct equity fund such as In-Q-Tel or OnPoint because the Navy 
would not be limiting the technology to a specific industry.   
 By using CRADAs, the Navy should be able to access the VC community by 
allowing testing of the VC firm’s technology in Navy laboratories or allowing Navy 
personnel to have access to the VC firm’s testing facilities.  The Navy could exercise a 
certain degree of control in the testing by having its own personnel contribute to the 
project.  This process may also give the Navy the ability to influence the technology by 
identifying the Navy’s needs to the VC firm. 
 
70 Vicki L. John, Department of Defense and Industry - A Healthy Alliance, diss., Naval Postgraduate 
School, 2001.  
71 "3710a.  Cooperative research and development agreements," Cornell university Legal Information 
Institute (2005), 22 Aug. 2005 <http://straylight.law.cornell.edu>.  
72 Vicki L. John, Department of Defense and Industry - A Healthy Alliance, diss., Naval Postgraduate 
School, 2001. 
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 Conceptually, this seems like a plausible scenario for the Navy and the VC 
community.  The difficulty comes from the Navy’s need to identify the technology in the 
VC community before engaging in joint testing and development.  It is at this point where 
the CRADA model runs into difficulty.  There must still be a mechanism that allows the 
Navy a means to identify promising technology before entering a CRADA.   
 We also feel that the VC community may be reluctant to enter into a CRADA 
with the Navy.  In our research with venture capitalists, many have addressed concerns 
about allowing information about the technology they are developing to get out.  While 
CRADAs protect intellectual property rights for the non-federal partners, it may still be 
hard to convince venture capitalists of this.  Previous research done on CRADAs 
confirms this by concluding that intellectual property rights are often the biggest hurdle 
to CRADAs being completed.73
 Aside from intellectual property rights, CRADAs have other problems that must 
be overcome.  An example is the domestic manufacturing requirements that are normally 
included.  With the current global perspective that most high technology firms take, any 
restrictions placed on development can pose a challenge.74
 The final hurdle that we will address is the patenting implications that come with 
CRADAs.  It is not unusual for technology developed in a CRADA to require patent 
protection before it is further developed for the commercial sector.  While there have 
been legislative provisions to allow for this to happen in such a way that both parties 
benefit, this can be something that the VC firms would rather not deal with.  Much like 
intellectual property rights, the VC firms would rather have exclusive rights to the 
technology.75  While CRADAs do not prevent this, the issue can complicate matters for 





73 Vicki L. John, Department of Defense and Industry - A Healthy Alliance, diss., Naval Postgraduate 
School, 2001. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Vicki L. John, Department of Defense and Industry - A Healthy Alliance, diss., Naval Postgraduate 
School, 2001. 
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C. SMALL BUSINESS INNOVATION RESEARCH (SBIR) PROGRAM 
 
Arguably two of the most successful “venture” initiatives the government has 
undertaken are the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program and the Small 
Business Technology Transfer (STTR) program.76  The SBIR program makes capital 
available, in the form of grants, to small businesses in the earliest stages of technology 
development.  The focus of the program is only on new technology.   The STTR program 
is a partnership program that helps facilitate research agreements between small 
businesses and not-for-profit or government contracted research facilities.  A STTR 
criterion for award is similar to SBIR.     
 Every federal agency that receives a research and development budget of $100 
million or more is required to establish and operate a SBIR program.  The participating 
agencies are required to set aside 2 ½ percent of their appropriated R&D budgets for the 
program.  Each agency administers its own program with the Small Business 
Administration taking an oversight role issuing directives and reports.  As of fiscal year 
2004, there were 12 federal agencies participating in the program with the DoD being the 
largest contributor.  Other participating agencies include the Departments of Agriculture, 
Commerce, Education, Energy, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, 
Housing and Urban Development, and Transportation; the Environmental Protection 
Agency, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and the National Science 
Foundation.   
The SBIR program is administered in three phases.  Phase I allows awards of up 
to $100,000 and is designed to determine the feasibility and scientific merit of the 
proposed research.  In addition, the quality of the performance of the awarded company 
will be reviewed.  Phase I typically lasts no longer than six months.  Phase II allows 
further research and development of the idea and grants awards of up to $750,000 for two 
years.  Phase II also includes a study on and a review of the commercialization of the 
technology.  Phase III is the commercialization stage.  Of note is that only Phase I 
awardees are eligible for subsequent awards.  Here the company must seek capital from 
 
76 Although this literature review will focus mainly on SBIR, many inferences can be made to STTR. 
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non-government sources.  Commercialization funding is prohibited by law, but 
participating agencies may continue to fund promising R&D with non-SBIR funding and 
may award procurement contracts for products developed in previous phases.77
 As will be discussed later in this section, one of the goals of the SBIR program is 
to stimulate innovation and commercialization of technologies by small businesses, 
particularly minority and disadvantaged businesses.  To accomplish this, the program is 
restricted to independently owned and operated for-profit organizations consisting of not 
more than 500 employees.  If the company is publicly-owned, at least 51% of the 
company must be owned by United States citizens or lawfully admitted permanent 
residents.  The company’s principal place of business must be located inside the United 
States.   
Since its inception in 1982, the SBIR program has dispersed over $18 billion 
dollars in awards.  There have been nearly 65,000 Phase I awards and 22,000 Phase II 
awards.  These awards have produced over 47,000 patents.78  Some prior companies that 
have received awards while privately held include Apple Computer, Chiron, Compaq, 
Federal Express, and Intel.79  The 2005 award pool is approximately $2 billion dollars 
and currently has over 6,000 active awards.80   
 
1. Evolution of SBIR 
 
Congress designated four main goals for SBIR; established by the Small Business 
Innovation Development Act of 1982,  
1. To stimulate mission-related technological innovation 
2. Use small businesses to meet federal R&D needs 
 
77 "Small Business Innovation Research Program," SBA Technology, Small Business Association, 15 
Aug. 2005 <http://www.sba.gov>.  
78 Ann  Eskesen, "SBIR Basics," In Know-Vation, Innovation Development Institue, 15 Aug. 2005 
<http://www.inknowvation.com>.  
79 Josh  Lerner, "The Government as Venture Capitalist:  The Long-Run Impact of the SBIR 
Program," Harvard University and National Bureau of Economic Research (1998).  
80 Ann  Eskesen, "SBIR Basics," In Know-Vation, Innovation Development Institue, 15 Aug. 2005 
<http://www.inknowvation.com>. 
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3. Foster participation by minority and disadvantaged persons in 
technological innovation 
4. Increase private sector commercialization of innovations derived from 
federal R&D.81  
In 1986, the six year law was granted an extension and the original expiration was 
moved from 1988 to 1993.82  In 1992, the law was reauthorized under the Small Business 
Research and Development Enhancement Act.  The purpose of this law was to: 
1. Expand and improve the SBIR program 
2. Emphasize the goal of increasing private sector commercialization 
3. Increase small business participation in federal R&D 
4. Improve dissemination of information on the SBIR program83 
This new act also provided for an increase in awards in both Phases I and II, as well as 
providing for subsequent inflation adjustments and program changes. 
 The latest reauthorization took place in 2000 under the Consolidated 
Appropriations Act of 2001.  The current law requires the Small Business Administration 
and participating agencies to: 
1. Expand the Scope of publicly available knowledge on grants  
2. Report annually on their programs84 
In addition, the law requires awardees to provide information to the SBA to help them 






81 Warren  Rudman, United States, Cong., Small Business Innovation Development Act of 1982, 97 
Cong., 219, 23 Jun 1982, 22 Aug. 2005 <http://www.thomas.loc.gov>.  
82 Nicholas  Mavroules, United States, Cong., A bill to provide the Small Business Administration 
continuing authority to administer a program for small innovative firms, 99 Cong., 443, 6 Oct. 1986, 22 
Aug. 2005 <http://www.thomas.loc.gov>.  
83 Warren  Rudman, United States, Cong., Small Business Technology Transfer Act of 1992, 102 
Cong., 564, 3 Oct. 1992, 22 Aug. 2005 <http://www.thomas.loc.gov>.  
84 John E. Porter, United States, Cong., Small Business Reauthorization Act of 2000, 106 Cong., 554, 
15 Dec. 2000, 22 Aug. 2005 <http://www.thomas.loc>. 
2. DoD and Navy Involvement in SBIR 
 
Since DoD is the recipient of the largest Research and Development Budget, it is 
also the largest contributor to the program.  The DoD SBIR budget for FY2005 is 
approximately $1.08 Billion. This accounts for 53.5% of the total federal SBIR program 
(Figure 9).85  The goal of DoD’s SBIR program is to “harness the innovative talents of 
the nation’s small technology companies for U.S. military and economic strength.” 86  To 
meet this goal, DoD’s SBIR program focuses on companies that are researching early-
stage topics that serve DoD or component needs and that have commercialization or 
military market value. 
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Figure 9.   SIBR Funding in 2005 
 
SBIR Funding for 2005 
NIH, 28.5%




Surveys conducted by DoD have shown 35% of companies have commercialized 
products or services directly related to SBIR funding.87  In addition, 45% of the projects 
have gone on to receive additional developmental funding through private means or in 
the form of Phase III contracts.  Per the law, DoD sets aside no more than the required 
2.5% of its RDT&E budget for SBIR.  Nearly 20% of annual awards go to minority and 
 
85"Small Business Innovation Research, Small Business Technology Transfer, and Fast Track," 
Acqusitiion, Technology, and Logistics, 22 Sept. 2005, Department of Defense, 30 Oct. 2005 
<http://www.acq.osd.mil>.  
86 "Small Business Innovation Research, Small Business Technology Transfer, and Fast Track," 
Acqusitiion, Technology, and Logistics, 22 Sept. 2005, Department of Defense, 30 Oct. 2005 
<http://www.acq.osd.mil>. 
87 United States, Government Accountability Office, Congress, Observations on the Small Business 
Innovation Research Program, GAO-05-86IT, June 2005, 15 Aug. 2005 <http://gao.gov>.  
women owned businesses.   A significant number of companies that receive Phase I 
awards have only 2-9 employees (28.8%).  Only 15% of companies receiving awards 












Figure 10.   DoD SBIR Component Contributions FY 2005 
 
The Navy’s SBIR program matches closely with DoDs.  The Navy is the second 
largest investor in SBIR in the DoD at approximately $252 Million (Figure 10).  The 
DoN’s SBIR program is designed to be “mission oriented” and provide opportunities for 
small businesses to become part of the national technology base providing research and 
technology to the military and commercial sector.  Its goal is to transfer technology from 
small businesses to active naval programs and systems.88   
Like DoD and other participating agencies, the Navy publishes a semi-annual 
solicitation describing research topics and issues in which it is interested.  It requests 
small businesses to propose research and development projects that will meet these 
needs, but that also have the potential for commercial development.  The proposals are 
judged on their scientific merit and technical feasibility.  The Navy measures success of 
its SBIR program by what technology is transferred into the fleet in the forms of 
products, tools, or services that benefit the acquisition community.  In 2003, the DoN had 




                                                 
88 "Department of the Navy SBIR/STTR Success Stories," Small Business Innovation Research, 
Department of the Navy, 22 Aug. 2005 <http://www.navysbir.com>.  
89 Ibid  
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Navy invested 23.4% of the DoD’s overall SBIR contribution and accounted for 81% of 
the Phase III funding in the form of acquisition and purchasing contracts as well as 
funding for further development.   
 
3. How SIBR Helps Innovation and Small Business 
 
 SIBR can, in some way, be credited with helping to develop technology and 
innovations that have resulted in over 47,000 patents.  That works out to a rate of one 
patent every 4 to 5 hours over the life of the program.  According to the Innovation 
Development Institution, nearly 400,000 graduate engineers and scientists work with or 
for SBIR funded companies.  That works out to be nearly three times the amount working 
in academia in the United States.90  All agencies involved have praised the results of the 
program and credit it with useful research and development for their agencies.  A 1989 
GAO report indicated that agencies reported that 75% of the research conducted under 
SBIR was as good as or better than other agency-funded research.  The report went on to 
say that some agency officials said the SBIR research was more likely than other research 
they oversaw to have success in invention and commercialization.91
 SBIR helps small high-technology based companies gain access to funding for 
research and development for high-risk concepts.  Typically, these companies may 
consist of a few or even one person with little or no capital.  Since the idea is not proven, 
there is high business risk.  The company also has high financial risk because it has little 
or no capital.  This unfortunate combination means that traditional lenders and investors 
(including Venture Capitalists) may not be interested in such a high risk venture.  Since 
1982, only about 7% of SIBR companies have been VC backed.92   
 
90 Ann  Eskesen, United States, Cong. House, Testimony to the House Subcommittee on Environment, 
Technology, and Standards, 109th Cong., 1st sess., HR 2943, 28 Jun. 2005, 15 Aug. 2005 
<http://www.house.gov>. 
91 United States, United States Congress, Government Accountability Office, Proposed Amendments 
to the Small Business Innovation Research Program, 30 Jun 1989, June 2005 <http://www.gao.gov>.  
92 Ann  Eskesen, United States, Cong. House, Testimony to the House Subcommittee on Environment, 
Technology, and Standards, 109th Cong., 1st sess., HR 2943, 28 June 2005, 15 Aug. 2005 
<http://www.house.gov>.  
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 Besides helping companies obtain government funding, SBIR may also help 
companies attract non-government investors.  In 1998, Josh Lerner conducted a study 
comparing SBIR backed companies to comparable companies developing similar 
technologies that were not SBIR funded.  He found that SBIR awardees typically had 
substantially greater employment and sales growth over the non-SBIR funded 
companies.93   
 Because of the competitive process of SBIR, being an awardee may signal 
creditability of a company to external markets and investors.  As noted earlier, selection 
for the program is based on scientific merit and technical feasibility.  Each agency has its 
own selection criteria and boards that conduct thorough reviews on each proposal.  The 
reviews are conducted by scientists and engineers who understand the needs of their 
agencies and are fully qualified to make these determinations.  The selection for an award 
is highly competitive.  Typical selection results are one Phase I award for every ten 
submitted.  Of those Phase I awards, only about 1/3 go on to receive Phase II funding.  
Typically the major limitation is funding.  Several agencies noted that many proposals 
were deemed qualified, but lacked the funding to award multiple proposals for the same 
research topic.94
 The certification that is signaled by a successful SBIR company is critical to the 
commercialization of products and services.  An important issue that must be kept in 
mind is that most small technology firms that are attracted to SBIR funding are not “full-
system builders.”95  The market and public sector want a complete product.  These 
companies are best suited for developing a concept into a technology and then require 
assistance to commercialize their idea.  Since the only real Phase III funding is in the 
form of contract awards, it is fully dependent on the company to acquire non-government 
investment to transition the technology to the market.  Lerner goes on to suggest that “a 
 
93 Josh  Lerner, "The Government as Venture Capitalist:  The Long-Run Impact of the SBIR 
program," Harvard University and National Bureau of Economic Research (1998).  
94 United States, Government Accountability Office, Congress, Observations on the Small Business 
Innovation Research Program, GAO-05-86IT, June 2005, 15 Aug. 2005 <http://gao.gov>. 
95 Ann  Eskesen, United States, Cong. House, Testimony to the House Subcommittee on Environment, 
Technology, and Standards, 109th Cong., 1st sess., HR 2943, 28 June 2005, 15 Aug. 2005 
<http://www.house.gov>.  
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key benefit of SBIR awards is the certification that they provide, it might be possible that 
a program that offered much more modest subsidies could also be effective in certifying 
the quality—and spurring the growth—of small high technology firms.”96
 
4. Venture Capital and SBIR 
 
 VC backed companies have been involved in the SBIR program since its 
inception.  To qualify for a SBIR grant, there must be the potential for commercialization 
of the product.  The program is not designed to bring a technology from its inception to 
the shelf.  Most companies do not have the business acumen to accomplish this.  This is 
where the expertise of VC can play a crucial role.   
The government can gain enormous benefit from leveraging its invested dollars 
with the commercial sector to develop needed technology.   For example, since the 
program’s inception, 607 VC backed companies have been awarded nearly 5,000 grants 
that have produced 7,138 patents.  Of these 607 companies 228 have achieved a liquidity 
event (211 have gone public and 17 acquired post Initial Public Offering (IPO)).  The 
market value of these companies is estimated at $45-50 billion with VC investment 
totaling $4.5 billion.  The total SBIR investment in these firms was $790 million.97  SBIR 
participation creates value in a company that can help it transition from a start-up to a 







96 Josh  Lerner, "The Government as Venture Capitalist:  The Long-Run Impact of the SBIR 
program," Harvard University and National Bureau of Economic Research (1998).  
97 Ann  Eskesen, United States, Cong. House, Testimony to the House Subcommittee on Environment, 
Technology, and Standards, 109th Cong., 1st sess., HR 2943, 28 June 2005, 15 Aug. 2005 
<http://www.house.gov>. 
 44
                                                
5. 51% Rule Debate 
 
Currently, there are bills before the House and the Senate that would relax the 
regulation concerning ownership of SBIR eligible companies.98  This has sparked a huge 
debate on whether this is beneficial to the program.  The bills before Congress would 
remove the “individual” clause and allow for majority VC backed ownership of a 
company to compete for SBIR grants.  The ruling would not change the size restrictions 
on companies participating in the program.   
An SBA ruling in 2001 determined that the “majority owned by U.S. citizens” 
requirement should be interpreted literally as an individual person, as opposed to an 
entity.99  The ruling was upheld in another challenge in 2003.  This debate seems to 
mostly focus on the bio-tech firms that apply for the National Institute of Health SBIR 
grants.  Other agencies (including DoD) have chosen to ignore the rule.  SBA is currently 
holding hearings and debates on the issue and proposes to have a decision by the end of 
the year.  However, a vote in the Congress could make the effort futile.   
 
D. IN-Q-TEL: THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY’S INITIATIVE 
 
 The most talked about government VC initiative, the Central Intelligence 
Agency’s (CIA) In-Q-Tel program can be credited with spurring the government’s recent 
VC interest.  In the mid 1990’s, the CIA realized that it could not keep pace with the 
commercial sector innovations that were coming about.  The government research and 
development programs that were the envy of the world in the mid 20th century and had 
produced such projects such as the U-2 and SR-71 were no longer leading the way.  The 
CIA was no longer at the forefront of technology. 
 As a result of this paradigm shift, senior leadership in the CIA started thinking 
about how the CIA could regain some of the lost ground.  They were not necessarily 
 
98 Christopher  Bond, United States, Cong. Senate, Save America's Biotechnology Innovative 
Research Act of 2005, 109th Cong., 1st sess., 1263, 16 June 2005, 30 Oct. 2005 
<http://www.thomas.loc.gov>.  
99 Penni  Crabtree, "Showdown on Grants; Venture-capital-controlled companies pressure SBA for 
slice of pie," San Diego Union-Tibune 17 Jun 2005. 
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looking for ways to fund new top secret projects, but were looking for ways to solve what 
seemed to be an ever increasing number of problems that were presenting themselves.  
One of the biggest problems was information overload from all of the various intelligence 
gathering sources the CIA used.  By one estimate, at this time, the CIA and National 
Security Agency (NSA) were receiving enough information to fill the Library of 
Congress every three hours.  This information was coming from all over the world, in 
different languages, formats, and types of media.100
 With the information management problem defined, senior leadership started to 
take action.  In 1998, the director of the CIA, George Tenet, launched the “Strategic 
Direction” initiative.  Included in this initiative was the following: 
Beginning with the critical field of IT, we will pursue this [new] approach 
through the creation of an external non profit enterprise designed to be 
electronically connected to leading research throughout the country.  This 
new entity will speed insertion of mature technologies, support rapid 
development of mission critical applications and enhance our ability to 
attract the skills and expertise vital to our success.101. 
 
 In order to carry out the director’s mission, the CIA started to assemble a special 
team that would create this new entity.  To assist with the development of the 
organization, the CIA hired Arthur Andersen LLP and the law firm Arnold and Porter.  
Together with these firms and the CIA’s in-house personnel, the mission was 
undertaken.102
 It was determined by the Deputy Director of Science and Technology that this 
new organization would have to be quick to react while also being able to address the 
CIA’s complex challenges.  As a result of this, the CIA team focused on four existing 
models which could interact with the government and fund research as baselines to create 
their own programs:103
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• Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs) 
• Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) /Advanced 
Concepts Technology Demonstration (ACTD) 
• Research Laboratories 
• Venture Capital  
 FFRDCs are research centers funded by the government but administered by 
universities or other non-profit entities.  FFRDCs are prohibited from manufacturing 
products which they helped create so they do not compete with private sector companies 
and are privy to private research that would otherwise not be divulged.  While FFRDCs 
research a wide variety of technologies, they are also subject to more bureaucratic 
oversight which limits their agility.  
 DARPA / ACTD focus on high end specialized technology for the military.  
These organizations are not concerned with commercial applications of their research but 
instead fund projects that are designed to be cutting edge with military benefit.  They will 
often overlook projects that are being developed with other’s interest in mind because if 
the technology is for others, it loses its strategic military benefit. 
 Research laboratories encompass a much broader category and can be classified 
as corporate, government, or independent.  They normally receive funding from an 
outside organization that may or may not have a say in the way the funding is to be used.  
The organization which provides the funding will usually stipulate how the research will 
be used.    Most research laboratories are established as “in house” entities that do 
research for a related organization. 
 While the above models could deal with the insertion of technology into the CIA, 
they were rejected because it was determined that they could not keep pace with the 
speed of technology transition that the CIA needed.104  As a result, the CIA started to 
look at the VC industry.  Conceptually, the VC industry’s goals were closely tied to that 
of the CIA. 
 
104 "Accelerating the Aquisition and implementation of New Technologies for Intelligence:  The 
Report of the Independent Panel on the Central Intelligence Agency In-Q-Tel Venture," Business 
Executives for National Security (2001), 1 Aug. 2005 <http://www.bens.org>.  
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 First, the VC firms funded projects which they hoped would have commercial 
applications, meaning that they solved a problem.  The VC industry was also segmented 
around specific technologies.  This meant that the CIA could design a program which 
focused on its needs, not on a general area of technology.   The VC industry was also at 
the forefront of the IT industry.   
 Even with all of this going in the VC model’s favor, when looking at the VC 
industry, the CIA’s team still did not find a model that perfectly fit the requirements that 
the CIA set forth.  The main reason seems to stem from the fact that VC firms are in the 
business to make money for the investors, not develop technology. Even so, it was 
determined that the VC models still held promise due to their ability to identify 
technology and then rapidly insert it into the commercial sector.  When analyzing the VC 
industry, the team realized that there were many innovations coming from this sector that 
had little government visibility.105   
 After analyzing the government R&D models and the VC industry, it was 
determined that the CIA could create a hybrid model that would incorporate the best of 
both worlds.  In 1999, Peleus Inc. was established as the CIA’s model.  The name was 
later changed to In-Q-IT to highlight the IT focus before finally being changed to In-Q-
Tel.106  The mission of this new organization was to “deliver leading-edge capabilities to 
the CIA and intelligence communities by investing in the development of promising 
technology.”107  
  
1. The In-Q-Tel Venture Capital Model 
 
 In-Q-Tel was unique because it combined many different models into one that 
was determined would best fit the CIA’s needs.  The In-Q-Tel model has incorporated 
aspects of the corporate VC industry, traditional business, non-profit business and 
 
105 Stephen F. Mendel, Personal interview. 25 Jul 2005. 
106 "Accelerating the Aquisition and implementation of New Technologies for Intelligence:  The 
Report of the Independent Panel on the Central Intelligence Agency In-Q-Tel Venture," Business 
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government R&D models.  The CIA argues that this mix is exactly what it needs to solve 
its IT problems.  The uniqueness of the In-Q-Tel model stems from the fact that by 
definition, most of In-Q-Tel’s goals seem to be incompatible. Simply put, the CIA wants 
access to new technology at a relatively low price and wants the technology quickly.  
Under normal government contracting, you can have only two of these at the expense of 
the third.108  In-Q-Tel is trying to balance all three and uses the VC industry as a good 
proxy on how to do this. 
 As opposed to being solely based on a VC model, In-Q-Tel uses the VC model as 
a tool to gain access to technology.  By using the VC model, In-Q-Tel makes equity 
investments into firms with promising technology and takes stakes in those companies.  
Most of the money that In-Q-Tel invests is dedicated to R&D with the hopes of speeding 
the development of products to the CIA and other intelligence communities.  In-Q-Tel 
sees itself as a technology accelerator with the money invested being used to bring the 
product to the market quicker.   
 The equity investments bring many other benefits to In-Q-Tel as well.  First, they 
make it so technology firms seek out In-Q-Tel, not the other way around. A benefit to this 
is that it brings the CIA access to a largely untapped market.109  Equity investments also 
allow In-Q-Tel to have a position on the board of directors.  This seat on the board allows 
In-Q-Tel to develop relationships with the firms it invests in and have unrestricted 
visibility into the firms’ products that are being developing.110   
 The third benefit that equity investments bring is they allow In-Q-Tel to share the 
cost of development of new products.  While the CIA is In-Q-Tel’s sole source of 
funding, In-Q-Tel makes investments with other VC firms as a way to spread the risk.  
By doing this, In-Q-Tel (or the CIA) does not have to bear the full burden of funding a 
project.  
 
108 Gregory K. Mislick, "Cost Estimation OA 4702," Naval Post Graduate School, Monterey, CA, 15 
Aug. 2005.  
109 Stephen F. Mendel, Personal interview. 25 Jul 2005. 
110 "In-Q-Tel - About Us," In-Q-Tel, 2003, Central Intelligence Agency, 18 Jul 2005 <http://www.in-
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  The fourth benefit of this type of investing is that smaller investments allow In-
Q-Tel to make more investments. The typical In-Q-Tel investment is between $1 million 
and $3 million dollars.111  More investments mean that there may be more technologies 
that In-Q-Tel can identify and develop for the CIA. This in-turn, allows In-Q-Tel to 
diversify.  Along with this, if In-Q-Tel’s investments become profitable, In-Q-Tel is able 
to take a share of the returns and reinvest them in other projects.  The greater the return, 
the less the CIA will need to invest in later years in order to still have a constant flow of 
new technology.   
 The final benefit that the VC model brings is that it allows In-Q-Tel to operate 
outside of any government or bureaucratic constraints that are placed on a government 
agency.  In-Q-Tel can obligate money in any year it wishes.  It is not required to comply 
with the Federal Acquisition regulations and is not restricted by the civil service 
personnel policy.  All of these traits give In-Q-Tel added flexibility. 
 
2. Customer Focus 
 
 While In-Q-Tel is run like a VC firm, it is important to remember that it is in 
business to provide the CIA with rapid technology transition to solve emerging problems.  
While In-Q-Tel acts like a VC, it differs from a traditional VC in many ways.  First, In-
Q-Tel’s goal is to develop technology, not generate financial returns for its investors.112  
There is an inherent conflict present when the industry’s performance metrics and In-Q-
Tel’s performance metrics differ and our research indicates this as one reason many VC 
firms question In-Q-Tel’s business plan.   
 Another difference which is related to performance measurement is that In-Q-




111 "In-Q-Tel Corporate Overview," In-Q-Tel, 2003, Central Intelligence Agency, 1 Aug. 2005 
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Tel makes is done with the hope that the investment will generate a product for the CIA.  
These products may provide returns in the form of National Security of which no direct 
correlation will ever be made.  
 The final difference that will be addressed is that In-Q-Tel may forgo profitable 
investments if they are not in keeping with the CIA’s needs because the CIA is its 
primary customer.  Whereas a traditional VC firm will almost always make an investment 
in an industry where it operates if it thinks it will generate a significant return, In-Q-Tel is 
focused on the CIA’s needs.113   
 Although In-Q-Tel is focused on the CIA, it is also looking long term.  The best 
situation for In-Q-Tel would be to invest in a firm that not only meets the CIA’s needs 
but has the possibility of becoming self sustaining.114  Here is an example of In-Q-Tel 
balancing its customer’s needs within the bounds of a VC model.   
 
3. In-Q-Tel Interface Center (QIC) 
 
 One of the most unique aspects of the In-Q-Tel model relates to how In-Q-Tel is 
able to interact with its customer, the CIA.  Although In-Q-Tel was chartered for the 
specific purpose of transitioning technology to the CIA, it was recognized early on that 
both parties would need to have a clear understanding of the other’s needs and 
capabilities.  In order to facilitate communication between the CIA and In-Q-Tel, In-Q-
Tel created the In-Q-Tel interface center or QIC for short.  The mission of the QIC is to 
“link the CIA and In-Q-Tel to ensure identification, development, transition and 
acceptance of unique value added commercially viable IT solutions that address the 
CIA’s critical needs.115”  Simply put, the QIC is the middleman between the CIA and In-
Q-Tel. 
 
113 "Accelerating the Aquisition and Implementation of New Technologies for Intelligence:  The 
Report of the Independent Panel on the Central Intelligence Agency In-Q-Tel Venture," Business 
Executives for National Security (2001), 1 Aug. 2005 <http://www.bens.org>. 
114 Stephen F. Mendel, Personal interview. 25 Jul 2005. 
115 "Accelerating the Aquisition and Implementation of New Technologies for Intelligence:  The 
Report of the Independent Panel on the Central Intelligence Agency In-Q-Tel Venture," Business 
Executives for National Security (2001), 1 Aug. 2005 <http://www.bens.org>. 
 51
                                                
 The QIC is staffed with full time CIA officers who are solely dedicated to 
working with In-Q-Tel.  The members of the QIC possess an inside knowledge of the 
CIA and its operations, while also possessing the security clearances necessary to 
communicate between the CIA and In-Q-Tel.116  The independent report on In-Q-Tel 
conducted by the Business Executives for National Security (BENS) for Congress 
suggests that the way the CIA staffs the QIC is the reason it is so successful.117
 The BENS report states that the QIC is primarily composed of people with one of 
two specialties:  IT background or significant CIA experience.  While there is some 
debate as to how many of each group should be represented in the QIC, the BENS report 
notes that both specialties are equally needed.  In order to identify current problems in the 
CIA, personnel with significant CIA experience are needed to navigate the bureaucracy 
and communicate the problems to In-Q-Tel.  At the same time, the QIC needs experts in 
IT who can communicate In-Q-Tel’s findings back to the CIA and show the CIA how the 
technology fills a need.118
 As the In-Q-Tel model has evolved, so have the QIC’s responsibilities.  Aside 
from just being the middleman, the QIC’s role has expanded to include oversight and 
administrative duties.119  The fact that an organization designed to assist In-Q-Tel is 
performing administrative as well as oversight duties initially caused some concern 
because it appeared that there could be conflicts of interest in the QIC responsibilities.  
After discussing the QIC role with In-Q-Tel though, the concerns were diminished.  
When one thinks about the mission of In-Q-Tel and its client, it is easy to understand the 
oversight and administrative challenges present.  Our research indicates that the QIC does 
a good job of managing all of its responsibilities to all parties while providing added  
 
 
116 "In-Q-Tel Corporate Overview." In-Q-Tel. Central Intelligence Agency. 1 Aug. 2005 
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Executives for National Security (2001), 1 Aug. 2005 <http://www.bens.org>. 
118 Ibid 
119 Wendy  Molzahn, "The CIA's In-Q-Tel Model," Acquisitiions Review Quarterly (2003), 28 Aug. 
2005 <http://www.dau.mil>.  
value to all organizations.  We could not find any instances where conflicts of interest 
came to be a problem and up to this point, In-Q-Tel’s success record seems to be proof 
that the relationship is working.120
 
4. The In-Q-Tel Process121
 
 Aside from the role of the QIC, much of In-Q-Tel’s success to this point can also 
be attributed to the In-Q-Tel Process also known as the “Q-Process”.  The “Q-Process” is 
an eight step process that starts by identifying the CIA’s needs and concludes with the 
acquisition and deployment of fielded technology.  Figure 11 gives a graphical 
representation of this process.  
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Solution Transfers to CIA 
Business Development  
Figure 11.   In-Q-Tel Business Development Progression122 
 
 The “Q-Process starts with Q0 where the CIA defines its needs to In-Q-Tel 
though the QIC.  Normally, the needs are identified to the QIC though the CIA’s Chief 
Information Officer or Advanced Technology Office.  During this stage, In-Q-Tel’s 
technology team will assist in evaluating the feasibility of the proposed problems in 
relation to possible solutions.   
 
120 Later sections will go into more detail about In-Q-Tel’s performance to date. 
121 All data for this section comes from the BENS report on In-Q-Tel unless otherwise noted. 
122 This chart is based on the In-Q-Tel “Q-Process” chart in the BENS report with modifications 
based on our research. 
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 The second stage, Q1, is characterized by a three tier assessment program in 
which In-Q-Tel starts dialogues with prospective companies.  The first part of the 
assessment is to review the macro-marketplace.  The second tier is to investigate specific 
firms in more detail with the possibility of constructing a deal.  The third tier is 
categorized as further technology research to analyze whether the proposed technology 
will still be of value to the CIA.  
 The third stage or Q2, is the portfolio management phase.  In this stage, In-Q-Tel 
matches problems identified in Q0 to a prospective portfolio company that may present a 
solution.  This stage goes more in depth to the contracting details such as legal 
requirements, financial requirements and technical expectations of the portfolio company.  
A contract is drafted in this stage which delineates all of the above.  
 The fourth stage or Q3 of the “Q-Process” is characterized by the drafting and 
signing of a contract between In-Q-Tel and the technology company.  During this stage, 
the product under development is being tested and evaluated while In-Q-Tel is providing 
feedback to ensure the product is meeting the CIA’s needs.  This stage is followed by the 
Contract Definition and Demonstration phase.   
 In Q4, the product being developed is tested in unclassified scenarios that the CIA 
uses to evaluate the overall fit of the product.  In this sense, the QIC is heavily involved 
in the testing.  The overall goal of this stage is to test the technology before the CIA can 
complete its more formal tests. 
 The next stage or Qp, is more of an evolution of the previous phase.  Here, the 
QIC expands its testing and allows the CIA to test the product on a limited basis.  During 
this stage, In-Q-Tel, the QIC and the CIA all work together to refine the product to better 
meet the CIA’s needs.  This stage is followed by the Commercialization or Q5 stage. 
 In the Q5 Stage, In-Q-Tel analyzes a technology to identify whether it will have 
commercial applications beyond the CIA.  If a product can be commercially viable, then 
it can significantly reduce the CIA total ownership costs and acquisition time frame.  
Here, In-Q-Tel and the QIC must walk a fine line.  The CIA will benefit from any 
commercial applications because the economies of scale that such scope brings.  At the 
same time, the CIA wants to make sure that the release of the technology will not 
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compromise and security concerns.  This stage is followed by the last stage, Qb.  In Qb, 
In-Q-Tel is focused on transition the technology to the end user.  The end user can be the 
CIA, the commercial market or a combination.   
 
5. Financial Perspective 
 
 When In-Q-Tel was conceived, it had almost unanimous support of senior CIA 
officials.  This support made it easier to get the program approved and funding 
appropriated quickly.  With the CIA being In-Q-Tel’s sole source of funding, it was, and 
still is, imperative that the CIA continue to fund In-Q-Tel if it is to remain a viable 
component of the CIA’s technology transfer program. 
 The first contract between In-Q-Tel and the CIA was in FY99 and it had a value 
of $28.7 million.  This contract was followed by a $37.27 million contract in FY00 and a 
$33.00 million contract in FY01.123  Since 2001, In-Q-Tel has been funded at 
approximately $35-40 million per year with over 40% of each year’s funding going to 
investments.124
 Due to In-Q-Tel’s line of work, current funding data for our research are hard to 
come by.  For the first year of operations in 1999, In-Q-Tel incurred start up costs of $2.5 
million, selling and administrative costs of $12.6 million and annual reoccurring costs to 
include salaries and compensation of board members of $10.1 million.125  Exact data 
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6. In-Q-Tel’s People  
 
 In-Q-Tel has offices located in Palo Alto, CA and Arlington, VA.  The Palo Alto 
office directs most of the VC projects and is staffed by eight people.  The Arlington, VA 
office liaisons with the CIA and is staffed with approximately 50 people.  Out of these 50 
people, about half are on the technology teams while the remaining half focus on 
technology transfer to the CIA.126
 A continuing challenge for In-Q-Tel is to find highly qualified personnel willing 
to leave successful careers in the IT or VC community and focus on national security 
issues.  Because of this challenge, In-Q-Tel has structured an employee compensation 
plan that specifically targets personnel in the private sector with either IT or VC 
expertise.127   
 The employee compensation plan is made up of three distinct pay breakdowns.  
The first is a base salary paid to all employees.  The base salary is benchmarked to the 
industry sectors where In-Q-Tel invests because it must compete with these sectors to 
recruit talent.  The base salary is then supplemented by an annual performance bonus and 
long-term incentives.128
 The annual performance bonus is based on how well In-Q-Tel and its employees 
perform in relation to annual goals and metrics specified at the beginning of the year.  In-
Q-Tel’s performance is analyzed by the Board of Trustees and the CIA.  Individual 
performance is judged by the respective employee’s manager before being approved by 
senior management.129
 The long-term incentive is also called the Employee Investment Fund.  This fund 
was created as a way to link the employees of In-Q-Tel to the firms they invest in by 
investing a portion of each employee’s compensation side-by-side with In-Q-Tel’s 
investments.  Through the Employee Investment Fund, each employee has a stake in all 
 
126 Stephen F. Mendel, Personal interview. 25 Jul 2005. 





                                                
In-Q-Tel investments.  This fund was created because as a non-profit, non-stock firm, In-
Q-Tel is not able to offer compensation bonuses (options) similar to publicly traded 
firms.  In-Q-Tel’s employees do not have a say over the selection of investments or over 
how the proceeds will be distributed.130
 
7. In-Q-Tel’s Performance 
 
 In the previous section of this paper, we discussed the life of a VC fund and when 
returns can be expected.  Our research indicates that because In-Q-Tel makes investments 
as a VC, the investments have a similar life.  Because of this life, only recently can one 
get an idea as to how well In-Q-Tel is doing and most data indicate that In-Q-Tel is doing 
very well. 
 The most recent data indicate that In-Q-Tel has reviewed 5000 business plans, 
invested over $100 million in 80 companies and 10 projects in university labs.  Of these 
investments, only four have collapsed.  This is an impressive record considering that a 
50% failure rate is expected in its line of business.131  In addition to the $100 million 
invested, In-Q-Tel has also leveraged $950 million in private sector funds to support 
technology being developed for the CIA.   
 When considering performance though, it must be clear that In-Q-Tel places 
technology transition before monetary profit.  Along this metric, In-Q-Tel has delivered 
over 100 technologies to the CIA to enhance its capabilities with many more in 
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from firms that would have not otherwise considered working with the government.133  
In this sense, In-Q-Tel has been successful in identifying and engaging new firms that are 
willing to deal with the government. 
 The final performance issue that is starting to emerge is that there appear to be 
more VC firms that want to do business with In-Q-Tel.  It is clear that other VC’s are 
starting to recognize In-Q-Tel’s success.  In the VC industry, reputation goes a long way 
and In-Q-Tel is well respected.  Robert Shaw, CEO of ArcSight, one of In-Q-Tel’s 
investments, has worked with numerous VC firms and was quoted in a recent article, “I’d 
say In-Q-Tel is as good or better than any other VC [firm] I’ve worked with.”134  Instead 
of In-Q-Tel searching for technology companies, now technology companies are looking 
to In-Q-Tel.  In the VC world, that is a sign of success.  
 
E. THE ARMY VENTURE CAPITAL INITIATIVE (AVCI) 
 
 In response to the 2002 Department of Defense Appropriations Act, Section 8150 
of Public Law 107-117, the Army set aside $25 million of its existing Research, 
Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) budget for the establishment of a not-for-
profit venture capital organization.  The purpose of the statute was to develop “better 
collaborative ties with the young, small, growth-oriented companies that take risks and 
push innovation.”135   
 The Army worked closely with the Rand Corporation in developing the concept 
of using VC as a vehicle to gather information on new technologies and to expedite the 
transfer of products to the hands of the soldier.  Bruce Held and Ike Change of Rand 
made a convincing argument that VC “exploits venture capital’s efficiency in developing 
technology, its access to the growing commercial technology sector, its capacity to 
respond with agility to changing technology, and its ability to leverage additional 
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resources throughout the development cycle.”136  The Army clarified the objectives of 
the Army Venture Capital Initiative (AVCI) in the Broad Area Announcement (BAA).  
“The objective of the VCC [Venture Capital Corporation] is to improve the business 
relationships between the entrepreneurial community of high technology innovators and 
the United States Army.”137   
 
1. Army’s Goals and Focus 
 
Through establishment of a VCC, the Army hoped to take advantage of the 
network of small companies involved in innovative technology development.  The 
benefits of doing so were twofold.  First, the Army believed having a credible corporation 
that was dedicated to representing the Army’s interests in the VC community would 
enhance awareness of innovative technology that exists or would exist in the commercial 
market.  Second, the Army anticipated that by having this knowledge and access to new 
technology the transfer of developed products would be accelerated.   
The Army chose to have the focus of their VCC be on engaging with companies 
that would improve the effectiveness of the individual combat-soldier, specifically the 
energy source that would power all the high-tech gear that is available to the soldiers.  
With all the technology being developed to improve the war-fighter’s battlefield 
effectiveness in the areas of information management, state-of-the-art communications, 
battlefield visibility and awareness, mobility and comfort, and advanced weaponry, 
soldiers require an energy source robust enough to power a wide-range of equipment.  
The Army was looking (is looking) for an independent power/energy source that will 
allow the individual foot-soldier to operate for a period of days or weeks in extreme 
environments and over varying distances and terrain.  The current technology available 
was deemed inadequate to meet the demands of the future soldier.   
 
 
136Bruce Held, and Ike  Chang, "Using Venture Capital to Improve Army Research and 
Development," Rand Corporation (2000), 1 Sep. 2005 <http://www.rand.org>.  
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2. AVCI Broad Agency Announcement 
 
In the fall of 2002, The Army Communications-Electronics Command (CECOM) 
released BAA: DAAB07-02-R-B223 to solicit proposals from companies interested in 
starting this type of venture.  The chosen company would have to be formed as a not-for-
profit corporation in accordance with Title 26, United States Code, Section 501(c)(3).  
The original length of the venture was to cover Fiscal Years 2002 and 2003.  The $25 
million award was to cover all aspects of the VCC to include all administrative, 
management, and legal fees; all business expenses; and all equity investments.  In  
addition, the initial allocation would cover the cost of technology transition assistance to 
companies receiving VCC funding that are making efforts to transition technology to the 
Army.138   
One special requirement in the BAA was that the VCC would be required to earn 
a significant enough Return on Investment (ROI) that the corporation could eventually be 
self-sustaining.  This would require the organization to balance the primary objectives of 
transitioning technology into the Army and development of relationships with 
entrepreneurial community with the ability to earn a ROI that would allow future 
investments and cover all management fees.  It would require the VCC to invest in 
technologies that would have both Army and commercial applicability, thus allowing the 
Army to leverage the commercial sector.  CECOM received 20 proposals in response to 
the BAA.  Of those proposals, Military Commercial Technologies, Inc (MilCom) was 
awarded the contract.   
 
3. History of MilCom 
 
 In May of 2003, MilCom Technologies was awarded a contract to develop and 
manage the Army’s VCC.  MilCom is a venture-backed company that was established in 
1997.  Its business focus is creating and developing innovative technology companies 
 
138 United States, US Army Communications-Electronics Command (USACECOM), Department of 
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from technology developed from partnering defense contractors, commercial companies, 
federal laboratories and other leading-edge research and development sources.139   
 MilCom established the idea of commercialization of military technologies based 
on three factors.  First, the federal government has a desire to develop leading-edge 
technologies to ensure national security and defense.  This requires large research and 
development budgets.  Second, as the military continues to downsize and budgets 
continue to shrink, the government has focused on achieving more value for the dollar, 
especially in the DoD.  Finally, the commercial sector is constantly looking for new 
technology solutions related to communications and information technology.   
 
4. Current Status of MilCom 
 
MilCom has established itself as a market leader in the commercialization of 
military technologies.  The corporation has been successful at leveraging technology 
developed through DoD RDT&E investment.  MilCom has created and invested in 
thirteen companies since its establishment, attracting approximately $600 million in 
capital from its partners.140  The corporation is also credited with creating approximately 
800 jobs.  MilCom has been successful at attracting other investors to its ventures.  
According to the MilCom AVCI proposal, it averages a 20 to 1 leverage on capital of its 
existing fund.  MilCom has established partnerships with several leading venture 
corporations including BancBoston Capital, APAX Partners, Inc, Banco Espirito Santo, 
MDS Capital Corp., Motorola Ventures, and Nortel Networks. 
 
5. MilCom’s Business Plan 
 
MilCom’s business model includes building and supporting its affiliate companies 
at every stage of development.  Like other VC initiatives, it uses a system that attempts to 
mitigate as many risks normally associated with new initiatives as possible.  First, 
 




                                                
MilCom’s commercial advisors help to ascertain new and emerging markets in the 
commercial sector.  The advisors are searching for “killer applications.”141   These 
applications will allow a new affiliate to quickly capture a significant share of the 
emerging market.  To help identify killer applications, MilCom holds quarterly meetings 
with commercial companies, government representatives, and business leaders including 
venture capitalists and investment bankers.  Once the killer applications are identified, 
MilCom works with its partners to find promising technology affiliated with the military 
sector that may prove to be lucrative in these markets.   
 After the technology has been identified, MilCom develops a solid business plan 
that will attract the level of investment necessary to ensure a high chance of success in 
the new venture.  The plan is developed by its staff with input from engineers, venture 
capitalists, and technology professionals.  Once the plan is solidified, MilCom works 
with its affiliates to create and recruit a talented team of professionals to manage, 
develop, and staff the new company.   
 In addition to continuing to mentor its new management team, MilCom continues 
to support the growing company after its launch by allowing the affiliate to leverage off 
its network of professionals and services.  MilCom’s affiliate services include valuation 
and investment strategy development, marketing advice, engineering support, legal, 
financial, tax and accounting support, help with recruitment of the board of directors, 
administration, industry relationships, and most importantly access to investment 
capital.142
 To increase the opportunity for success, MilCom’s commercialization process is 
designed to facilitate expedited transition of developed products to meet market needs.  
This will help the new company to achieve significant market share as well as providing 
superior returns to its partners and shareholders.  Like other VC corporations, MilCom 
hopes to eventually achieve some type of liquidity event once the affiliate has reached a 
mature stage.  To date, MilCom has only had one company go to an initial public 
 
141 Mike  Buffa, MilCom Technologies, MilCom Technologies' Proposal in response to AVCI 
Soliciation BAA: DAAB07-02-R-B223, 2002. 
142 "Various Pages on Website," MilCom Technologies, 15 Sep. 2005 
<http://www.MilComTech.com>.  
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offering.  In 2000, Triton Network Systems Inc, the first company launched by Milcom, 
went public.   By August of 2001, Triton was liquidating and closing down.143   
 
6. Affiliate Companies 
 
 MilCom’s other affiliate companies include the following:144
• GlobalSys Service, Inc. (GSS): provides professional programming 
services to European and US companies. 
 
• Real Digital Media (RDM): Markets and produces multimedia products 
for digital signage primarily used in point of sale advertising. 
 
• SkyCross: Designs, Develops, and manufactures next generation antenna 
technology for mobile and fixed communication in the 
telecommunications, automotive and mobile computing markets. 
 
• TelASIC Communications: a fables semiconductor company that will 
deliver high performance, cost-effective RF and analog mixed signal 
solutions for advanced wireless applications.   
 
• The NanoSteel Company, LLC (TNC): a materials company that markets 
new unique steel coatings and parts for the metal industry. 
 
• Theseus Logic: a fables semiconductor company developoing and 
marketing a family of “clock-less” digital signal processors.   
 
In addition to these affiliates, MilCom established OnPoint Technologies as the 
Army’s private not-for-profit corporation in accordance with their accepted proposal.   
 
7. OnPoint’s History 
 
 OnPoint Technologies was created by MilCom to serve as the bridge between the 
innovative technology community and the Army.  Although MilCom is no stranger to 
working closely with corporations affiliated with DoD, OnPoint marks the first time it 
 
143 Chad E. Watt, "MilCom: Still Standing, Still Making Tech Deals," Orlando Business Journal 
(2003), Lexis Nexis, Dudley Knox, Naval Postgraduate School, 15 Sep. 2005.  
144"Various Pages on Website," MilCom Technologies, 15 Sep. 2005 
<http://www.MilComTech.com>.  
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has worked directly with one of the DoD components.  MilCom established OnPoint 
because MilCom is a for-profit corporation and the law requires a not-for-profit 
organization manage the Army program.  Even though the two businesses are technically 
separate entities, they do share some members of the management team.  Mike Buffa 
serves as the CEO and chairman of the board for MilCom as well as serving as chairman 
of the board of trustees of OnPoint.  Jason Rottenberg is president of MilCom while 
serving as Managing Director for OnPoint in addition to serving as a member as its board 
of trustees.  OnPoint, like other affiliate companies of MilCom, leverage MilCom’s 
services.  As Matthew Sheehan of Private Equity Week noted, OnPoint seems to be 
simply a fund managed by MilCom with the Army being its only limited partner.145
OnPoint opened for business in 2003 with the $25 million of capital invested by 
the original Army appropriation.  In the 2003 Department of Defense Appropriations Act 
(Public Law 108-248 Section 8105), the Army Venture Capital Fund received a 
significant change.  Not only did Congress approve an extension of the program 
(originally the program was to expire at the end of FY03), but the legislature approved 
the Army transferring up to $20 million of unobligated balances in its Research, 
Development, Test, and Evaluation appropriation account during the last fiscal year 
before the account closed.146  The Army can only transfer this money to the account that 
will feed OnPoint.  This provided OnPoint with a significant influx of capital.  Jason 
Rottenberg, Managing Director of OnPoint said the two transfers the corporation had 
received as of June 2005 averaged $11 million.147  In late July of 2005, OnPoint received 
another transfer from the Army, this one amounting to $14 million.148  To date, OnPoint 
has received over $50 million.   
 
145 Matthew  Sheahan, "MilCom Marches to Army's VC Orders," Private Equity Week 16 June 2003, 
ProQuest, Dudly Knox, Naval Post Graduate School, 15 Sep. 2005.  
146 United States, Cong. House, Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, 2003, 107th Cong., 2nd 
sess., 532, 25 June 2003, 9 Oct. 2005 <http://thomos.loc.gov>.  
147 Jason Rottenberg, personal interview, Jun 2005.   Comparative analysis of figure was calculated 
through data on Thomson VentureXpert database and arrived at similar number. 
148 "Army's Venture Capital Effort Gets $14 Million Reprogramming Boost," Inside the Army 8 Aug. 
2005, 15 Sep. 2005 <http://insidedefense.com>.  
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Currently, OnPoint has about one-fourth of its fund invested in its affiliate 
companies with another quarter obligated for future rounds of investment.  The other half 
will be used to fund future investments as the opportunities present themselves.  OnPoint 
forecasted making between four and six investments each year with the average 
investment ranging from $500,000 to $2.5 million.  In operation for two years, OnPoint is 
currently at the lower side of this estimate with 8 affiliate companies.  However, 
Rottenberg said, “some quarters we won’t make any investments and others we may 
make several investments.”149  The focus is on the quality of the investment and 
leveraging its VC partners to develop a company that has a strong chance of transitioning 
technology. 
 
8. Investment Focus  
 
 As stated in the BAA, OnPoint is focused on investing in companies (or starting 
companies) that offer significant technology in the field of personal power and energy 
sources.  Its interests include generation, including fuel cells and micro-turbines, storage 
including batteries and capacitors, management using semiconductors and software, 
controls with circuits and voltage sensors, distribution using conducting polymers and 
super conductors, and usage with low power logic and components.150 OnPoint looks for 
individuals, teams, and companies that can provide innovative technologies or solutions 
for the needs of the Army.  These groups need to have insight into their markets along 
with a technology that has the opportunity to capture a significant portion of the market 
so that a sufficient return on investment can be realized.151   
 OnPoint must balance the needs of the Army and the need for a substantial return 
on investment to eventually sustain operations and investments.  Rottenberg says the 
 
149 Jason Rottenberg, personal interview, Jun 2005. 
150 "About OnPoint," OnPoint Technologies, OnPoint, 15 Jul 2005 <http://www.onpoint.us>.  
151 "About OnPoint," OnPoint Technologies, OnPoint, 15 Jul 2005 <http://www.onpoint.us>. 
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operation mirrors “a corporate venture fund.”152  It is structured like a typical VC, but 
takes a more strategic focus on identifying and transitioning technology. 
The strategic focus allows OnPoint to invest at any stage of development. Many 
VC companies like to invest in the early stages of a venture.  Early partnerships with 
affiliates tend to lead to higher return on investments.  Rottenberg stresses, more 
important than the high ROI, is the importance of OnPoint finding companies that have a 




OnPoint’s compensation structure resembles the industry average.  Its 
management fees and performance fees are slightly lower than the industry standard.  
However, since the focus of the program is transitioning technology to the Army, a 
special feature is provided in the compensation package that allows OnPoint to capture a 
significant bonus when products are actually transferred to the Army from a company 
that OnPoint has invested in.   
 
10. Risk Mitigation 
 
 Again, since the focus is providing technology transfer to the Army, OnPoint 
tends to be slightly more risk adverse than the typical venture capital company.  Using 
the same basic business plan that MilCom established, OnPoint attempts to mitigate risk 
by using a series of valuation metrics.  The valuation metrics include ensuring technology 
meets the needs of the Army and that market, technology, management, and financial risk 
are assessed and mitigated.153
First, venture opportunities that have greater probability of transferring needed or 
improved technology to the Army will receive higher valuation than companies that do 
 
152 Matthew Sheahan, "MilCom Marches to Army's VC Orders," Private Equity Week 16 June 2003, 
ProQuest, Dudly Knox, Naval Postgraduate School, 15 Sep. 2005.  
153 Mike Buffa, MilCom Technologies, MilCom Technologies' Proposal in response to AVCI 
Soliciation BAA: DAAB07-02-R-B223, 2002.  
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not, even if those companies have a stronger probability of a higher ROI.  Second, 
products that have “dual use” and the potential to capture significant market share in the 
form of competitive advantages will also receive high value marks.  Third, OnPoint 
spends a significant amount of time researching the technologies that are being proposed.  
In doing so, technology is evaluated on the risk of development in the context of time to 
produce (time to market), cost (longer development higher cost), and potential value to 
customers.  
Fourth, management risk is critically important to OnPoint.  OnPoint, like 
MilCom, wants to ensure an invested company has the right tools to succeed.  This means 
it will not invest in a company that does not have or the potential to have a strong, 
experienced management team.  Finally, OnPoint attempts to mitigate financial risk by 
looking for ventures that have the potential to have positive cash flows within two to 
three years.  Its staff looks to balance the risk with the amount of cash required by the 
investment.  The lower cash requirement with the high prospects of near term positive 




 The following are companies in which OnPoint is currently invested.  None of the 
affiliate companies have achieved a liquidity event at time of publication. 
 
• A123 Systems: developer of advanced Lithium-Ion based cells for 
rechargeable battery packs.   
• Atraverda: developer of advanced bi-polar battery electrodes for 
rechargeable batteries that can be utilized in a wide ranged of chemistries, 
including lead acid, NiMH, and Li-Ion. 
• Integrated Fuel Cell Technologies, Inc (IFCT): developer of next 
generation fuel cell systems in portable systems. 
• Nanosolar: developer of thin-film solar technology for roll-to-roll printing 
of solar cells on flexible substrates. 
 
154 "About OnPoint," OnPoint Technologies, OnPoint, 15 Jul 2005 <http://www.onpoint.us>. 
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• PowerGenix: developer and seller of next-generation rechargeable 
batteries. 
• PowerPercise Solutions Inc.: fabless semiconductor company specializing 
in battery management devices. 
• Ultracell: developer and seller of integrated fuel cell systems. 
• Zinc Matrix Power: developer of high-performance rechargeable alkaline 
battery technology for commercial and military markets. 
 
12. OnPoint Successes 
 
 Although OnPoint has been able to identify several promising technologies that 
have the potential for Army use, to date there has only been one transfer of a product to 
the Army.  In December of 2004, Gary Davison, CEO of PowerPercise Solutions 
presented the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology 
the BA-5590A battery pack with an integrated low-cost state-of-the-art power indicator.  
The BA-5590A is the most widely used battery in the Army.  It powers the SINCGARS 
radio and several other small electronic devices.  A typical field evolution would find 
soldiers throwing away batteries with several hours of battery life left because there was 
no simple way of knowing how much power remained.  This innovation is expected to 
save the Army (and Marine Corps) millions in procurement, disposal, and storage costs 
each year, not to mention the reduced logistical burden on the soldiers.  The entire project 
from development to production took ten months and the Army and OnPoint look to this 
as an example of how the venture community can help to provide and transfer technology 




 OnPoint’s outlook for the future with the Army seems to be positive.  The fiscal 
year 2006 Department of Defense Appropriations Act is expected to include language 
that extends the program’s funding through FY08.  At the current rate of capital 
investment by the Army, this would bring the fund to nearly $75 million in FY08.  
Rottenberg says that the power and energy industry has some promising technologies that 
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are near full development.  He expects higher-energy batteries that will allow soldiers to 
carry 2 batteries instead of four at a reduced weight and longer battery life.  He also 
expects the introduction of fuel cells that will allow soldiers to rely on small cartridges 
instead of bulky batteries.   
Although it is still relatively early in the company’s history, Rottenberg is 
interested in expanding the corporation to include other Army interests as well as other 
components and DoD organizations.   
 69
IV. OPTIONS FOR DON INVOLVEMENT IN VENTURE 
CAPITAL 
 
 This chapter will discuss possible options the Navy can undertake if it wishes to 
enter the VC industry. There are literally hundreds of models being used today by VC 
firms, as well as corporations, and all levels of government.  Some of these models have 
been successful, many more have not.  When reading this chapter, the reader should take 
note that the options being put forth are not all inclusive.  Looking for options for a 
venture initiative is a complex process.  In order to simplify the process for the reader, 
this chapter will be broken down into the following subsections: 
 
• DoN Technology Needs  
• VC in Relation to the Navy’s Technology Model 
• Alternatives for Navy Involvement in VC 
o Status Quo 
o Engage VCs Through a Liaison Office without Equity Investments 
o Invest in Current Government VC initiatives 
o Establish a Navy Specific VC Firm 
  
 Previous chapters of this paper have discussed several types of venture activities 
which represent government interests.  Based on these previous sections and the 
framework listed above, this chapter will now allow us to further analyze specific models 
with respect to the Navy’s goals.  While there are many valid business models for VC 
activity, we limited this section to the four options listed above because our research 
indicates that these models represent the broadest scope of involvement with the greatest 
probability of success. It is important for the reader to understand that each option that 
will be discussed is valid for a specific set of objectives.  As such, the criteria for success 
in each model will be different.  In the next chapter, we will put forth our 
recommendation as to which model will best suit the Navy’s needs. 
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A. DON TECHNOLOGY NEEDS155
 
 There are several areas of technology in which the Department of the Navy is 
interested.  The Navy’s Office of Naval Research (ONR) has the responsibility of 
communicating the Navy’s technology needs to those organizations that may provide 
solutions.  These organizations include government and private labs, schools and 
universities, and for-profit and not-for-profit businesses.  Navy needs are communicated 
to these organizations through a variety of channels including Broad Area 
Announcements, solicitations, Federal Business Opportunities (FedBizOps), X-tech 
websites156, conferences, and technology roundtables.  The range of technology needs 
spans the vast capabilities and missions of the Navy and Marine Corps.   
ONR is organized into five science and technology departments that focus on 
specific areas of research and development.157  The first department is the Information, 
Electronics, and Surveillance Department.  Its focus is on technology programs that 
attempt to enhance surveillance capabilities, communications, command and control, 
human-computer interaction, and electronic warfare.  Second is the Oceanic, 
Atmospheric, and Space Department that focuses on sensing and systems and processes 
and prediction of integrated, multidisciplinary programs in naval environments and 
undersea warfare.  Subjects covered in this department include battle space environments 
to anti-submarine warfare to mine warfare.  Third, the Engineering, Materials, and 
Physical Sciences Department helps contribute to naval strengths in the areas of 
chemistry, physics, structural and functional materials, structural, solid, and mechanics, 
as well as propulsion, energetics, and hull, mechanical, and systems.  The fourth 
department is the Human Systems Department.  Human Systems are concerned with 
 
155 "Various Webpages," Office of Naval Research, Department of the Navy, 1 Oct. 2005 
<http://www.onr.navy.mil>. 
156 X-tech are organizations that are designed to identify technologies desired and either find a 
commercial solution or have a solution developed.  The X-techs include AirTech (Aircraft), SurfTech 
(Ships), CarTech (Carriers), SubTech (Submarines), and I-Tech (ForceNet).  In addition, the Marine Corps 
Warfighting Lab (MCWL) provide Marine Corps specific needs.  
157 There are literally hundreds of specific needs listed on several websites, announcements, and 
solicitations.  Our goal here is to attempt to demonstrate the wide variety of capability needs the Navy has 
by showing how ONR classifies its research and development. 
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programs that are at the leading edges of medical science, human performance, 
biotechnology, training and human factors, neural information processing, and 
biorobotics.  Finally, the Expeditionary Warfare Division is concerned with aeronautics, 
avionics, propulsion, ballistics, warheads, missile guidance, seekers, parallel distributed 
processing, stealth technology, advanced sensors, and other programs associated with 
Marine Corps and other ground combat operations. 
Although several of the areas of research and development that the Navy is 
interested in pertain to specific Navy capability needs, many areas may have, at least 
limited applicability to other federal, state, and local governments, as well as the 
commercial sector.  Finding ways to leverage these other agencies to make the R&D 
dollar stretch a little further makes sense.  ONR has achieved some success in this 
endeavor through its industrial and corporate programs like ManTech (Manufacturing 
and Technology Programs), technology transfer programs, corporate internships, 
SBIR/STTR, and most recently, the establishment of the CTTO. 
 According to the CTTO’s web page there are several specific focus areas in which 
it is currently interested.158  First, the CTTO is looking at technologies that address the 
ever changing needs of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT).  These could include data 
fusion and information processing, distributed operations, and the prediction, detection, 
prevention, and neutralization of Improvised Explosive Devices (IED).  Second, the 
office is focused on finding ways to improve the linkage between the Navy’s Sea Shield, 
Sea Strike and Sea Basing initiatives (called FORCEnet).  This includes improvements in 
shared situational awareness across the force, technologies in computer network defense 
and information assurance, ubiquitous communications and network infrastructure 
including bandwidth management, data link management and architecture, and Joint 
combat ID (blue force tracking).  Next, the Navy has a need for technological 
advancement in power generation, distribution, and management, as well as 
advancements in sensing technology for data processing, monitoring, and targeting.  The 
Navy is also interested in advancements in autonomous vehicles and other robotics.   
 
158 "Naval Needs," Commercial Technology Transfer Office, Office of Naval Research, Department 
of the Navy, 1 Oct. 2005 <http://www.onr.navy.mil>.  
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Finally, CTTO is concerned with innovative ways to improve logistics by way of asset 
visibility, materials handling, and obsolescence.  Although these specific focus areas 
were listed, the CTTO is always looking for any new technology or innovations that 
could prove to be a cost saver or improve an existing capability. 
 The areas of focus listed by the CTTO have the potential to be addressed though 
the commercial sector.  There are several private corporations and organization, as well 
as many government organizations that are faced with the same problems and needs as 
the Navy.  Leveraging these organizations to discover answers to these issues provide 
benefits to all involved.  The Navy is already addressing these problems through its 
industry and corporate programs.  The question concerning this research is can the VC 
community assist the Navy is providing alternatives to its needs?   
 
B. VC IN RELATION TO THE NAVY’S TECHNOLOGY MODEL 
 
 There is no question that budgets in the Navy and other government agencies are 
getting tighter.  The Navy is constantly looking for innovative ways to improve efficiency 
and effectiveness.  The area of Research and Development is no different.  The Cold War 
Era of defense-leading innovation is over.  Because of this, DoD is now a smaller 
customer and must look for ways to leverage others in order to meet its capability needs.  
This will require increased focus on commercial or dual-use technologies.  “The 
Department will develop military-unique capabilities only after it has determined that 
commercial capabilities will not meet its requirements.”159  VC may prove to be a viable 
asset for recognizing and meeting these requirements.   
 The question of whether the VC market is a viable investment opportunity is 
debatable.  During the “dot com” boom of the late 90’s and early 00’s, the returns on 
equity investment from VC firms steadily outpaced more traditional investments.  In 
1999 and 2000, venture capitalists were seeing 5-year rolling average returns of 47% 
 
159 William J. Perrry, United States, Department of Defense, Annual Report to the President and 
Congress, Washington, DC, 1995.  
 73
                                                
compared to the mid 20’s and low 30’s for the S&P 500 and NASDAQ respectively.160  
However, like other investments falling victim to the market forces in recent years, VC 
returns have been less than stellar and 5-year averages have fallen to -1.3%.  This average 
is still higher than the S&P’s -5.4% and the NASDAQ’s -11.8.161  Since the Navy’s 
primary reason for being involved in VC is not return driven, this should not be a real 
concern.  The question then becomes, can the VC market provide the technological 
advances or knowledge that the Navy needs? 
First, the VC community is already investing in the technology areas stated as 
focus areas by the CTTO.  In 2004, venture capitalists invested $6.4 billion in 901 
companies in the computer hardware and software industries; $3.3 billion in 325 
companies in the communications industries; $2.2 billion in 230 companies in the 
semiconductors and electronics industries; and $684 million in 110 companies in the 
industrial and energy industries.162  There is plenty of opportunity for the Navy to 
leverage the money being invested in the commercial sector.   
 Second, venture backed companies have been proven to be effective contributors 
to the U.S. Research and Development industry.  Venture capitalists are willing and able, 
through their financial instruments, to invest in high-risk innovative projects. This is 
confirmed by the evidence that technological revolutions which have resulted in the 
transformation of industries have been led by VC-backed firms, for example, the firms 
that have pioneered each new generation of computer technology (PCs, personal 
computers, software, etc.) have been financed by VC163.  
As stated previously in Chapter II, some research has been conducted on the 
innovation contributions of venture backed companies.  Dr. Josh Lerner and Dr. Samuel 
Kortum found that between 1983 and 1992, while VC funding averaged less than 3% of 
corporate R&D, it was responsible for approximate 8% of industrial innovations during 
 
160 National Venture Capital Association Yearbook, New York: Thomson Venture Economics 
Information, 2005.  
161 Ibid 
162 Ibid  
163 France, Organization for Economic Development and Co-operation, Venture Capital and 
Innovation, Paris, 1996.  
 74
                                                
the same period164.  Their study went on to find that a dollar of VC funding was about 
three times more potent for stimulating patents than a dollar of traditional R&D.165   
In another study by the National Venture Capital Association, it was determined 
that for the last 20 years, small businesses, the type in which venture capitalists have 
interest, have been contributing more to U.S. Research and Development.  In 2003, small 
companies contributed $40 Billion in R&D, up from $4 Billion in 1984.  This accounted 
for an estimated 20% of the total U.S. R&D in 2003 compared with just over 5% in 
1984.166   
If Lerner and Kortum’s theory holds true, the influx of funding has caused an 
increase of innovation provided by VC backed companies.  With the increased 
contribution of VC backed companies to the R&D industry; it makes sense for the Navy 
to leverage this sector with its own technology needs. 
 Third, being involved with VC can provide access to companies that would not 
otherwise do business with government agencies.  There exists a perception by some 
small businesses, whether warranted or not, that doing business with the government is 
bad business.  A survey of technology firms in 2003 showed that 40% of the IT 
companies interviewed did not want to do business with DoD.167  Whether it’s the 
regulations and restrictions that come with taking the government’s money or the slow 
payments that can sink cash strapped young companies or the fear of “red tape” or even 
losing intellectual property rights, a sector of the innovation market would rather take its 
money from private investors.  Partnering with the VC community may provide access to 
these companies.  If the Navy were to approach a company through a VC firm as a 
potential investor, it may break down some of these barriers.   
 Fourth, venture capitalists may provide access to technology that the Navy did not 
know existed.   As stated in Chapter I, the VC community is based on networking.  
 
164 Samuel Kortum, and Josh  Lerner, "Assessing the contribution of Venture Capital to Innovation," 
Rand Journal of Economics (2000), 28 Oct. 2005 <http://www.rje.org>. 
165 Ibid 
166 Venture Impact 2004, Arlington, VA: Global Insight, 2005, Venture Capital Benefits to the U.S. 
Economy, 28 Jul 2005 <http://www.nvca.org>. 
167 "Survey of Information Technology Firms," National Defense University, Oct. 2003, Department 
of Defense, 30 Oct. 2005 <http://www.ndu.edu>.  
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Through this network VCs have access to established businesses and corporations, start-
ups, labs, universities, and people with just a good idea working out of their garage.  To 
be involved in this type of network requires a special skill set and access to a broad 
stream of investment prospects.  Fund managers are experts in their areas and typically 
look at hundreds of deals before making an investment.  They have management 
backgrounds and established networks in specific industries.  Their skill set includes, 
financial acumen, expertise in dealing with people, and negotiating knowledge.168  But it 
is not only these skills that are required; the VC is an apprenticeship business.  It takes 
years of mentoring to be able to assess investments, build and motivate management 
teams, source capital and strategic partners and deal with the unpredictable threats to the 
business.169  Establishing relationships or being involved in the VC community gives 
visibility to the technology that these small companies have, but that can only be 
accessed through the VC network. 
Finally, by becoming a corporate venture capitalist, the Navy can benefit from 
increased awareness of technology innovations.  Corporate VC is a specific type of 
venture investment that is conducted primarily by non-financial corporations.  The focus 
in corporate venturing is not so much return on investment as finding investment 
opportunities that are congruent with the parent company’s strategic technology or that 
provide synergy or cost savings.170   
Dr. Gary Dushnitsky of the Wharton School of Business at the University of 
Pennsylvania says that large corporations are realizing that they no longer have a 
monopoly on the next big technology breakthrough.   “They [corporations] need a tool to 
scan, identify, and leverage or harness entrepreneurial or innovative technologies.”171  As 
stated previously, the DoD and the Navy have realized that it is not feasible for 
government labs and R&D facilities to produce all of the needed capabilities.  Like their 
 
168 "What Makes a Good Venture Capitalist?" Flag Capital, 1 Oct. 2005 <http://flagcapital.com>.  
169 Ibid. 
170 National Venture Capital Association Yearbook, New York: Thomson Venture Economics 
Information, 2005.  
171 "How Corporate Venture Capital Investing Increases Innovation," The Wharton School, University 
of Pennsylvania, 15 Oct. 2005 <http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu>.  
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corporate counterparts, these organizations must look externally.  With the innovation 
and contributions of VC backed companies, the venture market may provide the needed 
visibility.  
 Dushnitsky goes on to explain that corporate venture capital is one leg of a three-
legged stool whose other two legs are a strong internal R&D capability and strong 
alliances with academic or government researchers.172  This analogy fits nicely with the 
Navy’s research and development strategy.  The Navy already has well established 
internal R&D in addition to programs that focus on academic research.  Dushnitsky and 
Michael J. Lenox, partnered to conduct research that focused on comparing companies 
that invested in corporate venture capital with those that did not.  They concluded that 
corporations which make venture investments to gain access to outside innovations tend 
also to have strong internal research and development capabilities and that the two are 
“complements rather than substitutes vying for research dollars.”173  In addition, their 
research has found that the contribution of corporate venture capital investment to firm 
value is strongest when it is focused on attaining a window on technology rather than 
purely a narrow return on investment.174  This seems to be the Navy’s focus also.  The 
Navy already has some of the needed components to have an effective corporate venture 
capital program. 
 We have identified several benefits to the Navy being involved in VC.  First, VC 
firms are already investing in the same areas in which the Navy is interested.  Second, 
VC backed companies are proven innovators.  Third, VC firms may provide access to 
companies that would not normally do business with the government.  Fourth, VC firms 
may provide insight into technologies not previously known.  And finally, the Navy 




172 "How Corporate Venture Capital Investing Increases Innovation," The Wharton School, University 
of Pennsylvania, 15 Oct. 2005 <http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu>. 
173 Gary Dushintsky, and Michael J. Lenox, "When do Firms Undertake R&D by Investing in New 
Ventures," Strategic Management Journal (2004), 15 Oct. 2005 <http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu>.  
174 Gary  Dushintsky, "When do Corporate Venture Capitalist Investment Create Firm Value," 
Strategic Management Journal (2004), 15 Oct. 2005 <http://konwledge.wharton.upenn.edu>.  
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For these reasons, we believe that the DoN can benefit from establishing a venture 
initiative.  The next subsection will discuss possible options for establishing a venture 
program. 
 
C. ALTERNATIVES FOR NAVY INVOLVEMENT IN VC 
 
1. Status Quo 
 
 The first option is to decide not to engage or be involved in the VC industry.  The 
decision to not engage the VCs does not mean that the Navy cannot observe current VC 
programs.  Although the government has a few venture programs that have been around 
for a significant amount of time, the majority of VC programs are relatively new and 
untested.  By not engaging the VC community but instead, closely observing the VCs, the 
Navy may be able to get a better understanding of its goals with respect to VC and the 
possible returns that may be possible to enjoy.  
 In-Q-Tel has probably enjoyed the most success thus far in transitioning 
technology into its organization and would prove to be a good target for observation, as 
would OnPoint.  Even though OnPoint has only had one “successful” transition, it is a 
much younger firm that has great potential.  However, time will be the true test for both 
of these organizations though.  Taking a “wait and see” position could reduce the risk of 
losing millions of dollars into a venture that fails to produce any fruit.  There is no budget 
impact in the business as usual option; however there may be opportunity cost.   
If it is true that VC can fill a gap in the Navy’s view of innovative technology, by 
not participating in some type of VC activity, the Navy could be missing solutions to 
capability needs.  In addition, if the Navy decides to become involved in VC at a later 
time, it may be forced to work in the constraints set by laws and regulations shaped by 
other agencies.  For example, the Army required special appropriation language to get its 
program off the ground.  If the Navy decides to go with a program significantly different 




Currently, several agencies are looking at a myriad of tailored programs.  By waiting to 
be involved, the Navy may miss the opportunity to help define the government’s role in 
the venture industry. 
 
2. Engage VCs through a Liaison Office  
 
 This option is closely related to previous efforts by the CTTO to engage the VC 
community.  It calls for the establishment of an office or expansion of an existing office 
to act as a liaison or intermediary between the VC industry and Navy’s system commands 
and program managers.  The office would work closely with both groups having an in-
depth knowledge of the Navy’s needs and an understanding of how the VC community 
may be able to meet those needs or, if needed, create solutions for the Navy.   
 Establishing an office or section within the Navy’s corporate structure would 
allow the office to tap into the vast knowledge base of current needs and capabilities 
already established and documented in existing organizations such as ONR.  Locating the 
office within this structure would allow it to have a broad scope and utilize existing lines 
of communication with system commands and program managers.  It would facilitate 
knowledge sharing and coordination to hopefully reduce duplication of effort in 
researching and finding new technologies.   
Another significant benefit to this option would be the control and visibility given 
to the Navy that would not be realized under other options.  Since the office would fall 
under the direct control of the Navy leadership, senior officials would be able to direct 
the efforts of the staff in regards to certain technology families and critical needs.  This 
would provide for a much more flexible program than would be received through a 
private firm bound by contractual covenants.  This new office would be able to refocus 
efforts to meet emerging needs associated with the ever changing battlefield.  In addition, 
due to the flexible nature of this operation, the scope of effort could possibly be adjusted 
to meet budgetary restrictions.  This benefit would not be realized under a ridged 
contractual agreement that would be required for direct investments. 
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Since equity investments would not be required, the financial risk associated with 
an investment program of this sort is reduced.  In addition, this option would help to 
mitigate the political risk associated with the government operating and investing in its 
own VC firm.  
This option has some considerations and limitations that should be noted.  First, 
since this program would still fall within the regulations and restrictions associated with 
other government programs, the Navy may still not be able to reach that small portion of 
the innovation market that is averse to working with the government.   In addition, the 
liaison office would still be bound by appropriation and acquisition law in funding, 
researching, and developing new technologies.   
Second, the Navy corporate leadership would need to overcome the cultural 
concerns on Temporary Additional Duty (TAD) travel.  Throughout the Navy and Marine 
Corps there is a concern associated with individuals that travel a great deal.  To be 
successful in the venture community, the liaison team would need to meet with VCs, 
attend technology conferences and conventions, and hold such meetings to demonstrate 
the needs and desires of the Navy.  As stated previously, the VC community is based on 
networking.  To be successful, the liaison office would need to be fully engaged with the 
community and that would require a significant amount of travel.   
Third, whether a new office is established or the mission is given to a functioning 
office, the endeavor would require an influx of funding to get started.  The new venture 
would require an increase in staffing.  The new staff would need a special skill set that 
would allow them to understand and communicate the technical needs of the Navy while 
at the same time be able to comprehend the business needs of the VCs.   
 The fourth and final limitation that will be addressed with this option is the 
differentiation between the customer and investor relationship. If the Navy were to 
engage with VC though a liaison office without equity investments, then it would become 
just another possible customer to the VC firms. While this is not necessarily a bad thing 
for the Navy, it may prohibit them from being privy to insider information about the 
technology or the industry in which the VC firm is operating.  If the Navy wants to  
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transition technology, this would not be a factor.  If the Navy wants to learn about the 
technology coming from a specific industry, this option could limit the information 
available to it. 
 
3. Invest in a Current VC Initiative  
 
 Investing in an established fund would give similar advantages and disadvantages 
to the Navy when compared to establishing its own private VC company.  One significant 
difference is investing in a current fund would require less capital outlay at start up 
because the investment would be based on an established fund and business plan.  This 
still would allow the Navy to leverage other corporate, private sector, government, DoD 
and service investments.  This option would also allow the Navy to research and invest in 
a fund that meets specific Navy needs or allow it to seek joint ventures with other DoD 
components.  Further, this option would help facilitate technology sharing across the 
DoD by encouraging components to leverage one another to obtain the greatest value for 
their dollar. 
 While this option has definite advantages that are provided though equity 
investments, there are some challenges that this option presents as well.  First, even if the 
Navy were able to find other components to invest in a specific technology, the Navy 
may be competing with other investors in researching specific technology to meet the 
Navy’s needs.  This means that the Navy might have to align its needs with the fund’s 
current investors. 
 The second challenge is that this option will cost money.  If the Navy were to 
decide to do this, it would need to commit enough capital to justify equity investments for 
the investing firm.  The amount of capital required could be in excess of $10 million 
dollars, depending on the number of investments planned and the focus area of the 
investments.  The Navy may also be required to make capital infusions for a number of 
years in order to see the investments through to maturity.  This option would be a long 
term program. 
 The final challenge, related to the first, is that an established fund already has an 
established management system and business plan.  It has a set direction in the type of 
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industry in which it is investing.  A new investor into the fund may find it difficult to 
modify or change that direction.  In addition, if this fund is defense focused (finding 
technologies for DoD components), the Navy would be competing with the needs and 
interests of other DoD agencies and components.  To gain full value of leveraging from 
other agencies, the Navy would need to consider the motives and desires of other 
investors.  If the Navy were to choose to establish its own direction within a specific 
fund, this would most likely result in an increased management fee assessed to the Navy 
and require the Navy to put up significantly more money than it otherwise would have in 
order to justify the increased investments. 
 
4. Establish a Private VC Firm 
 
 Although there is precedence already functioning in government, establishing a 
private VC firm is probably the most complex, costly, and risky option of all those 
proposed.  However, as with any investment, the increased risk gives the opportunity for 
increased returns. 
 There are several benefits to starting a private venture activity.  First, the 
company would be able to function independently of government restrictions and 
bureaucracy that bog down current technology acquisition programs.175  The formation 
of the company would allow the Navy to leverage other private investors allowing the 
cost of research, development, and some testing and evaluation to be shared by investors 
who would benefit from the commercial applications of the products developed.  This 
also would allow for economies of scale in production.  If theory were to hold true, the 
Navy would not be the target market for the technology being developed.  This means 
that it could take advantage of increased production and reduced procurement costs.  In 
addition, even if the Navy’s company were just a minority investor in a particular start-up 
company, this could still give it the same access to information on the technology and 
market to which an investor is privy.   
 
175 Andrea Shalel-Esa, "Pentagon must fix weapons buying, says panel exec." MSNBC.com 19 Oct. 
2005. 20 Oct. 2005 <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9756097/>. 
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 Equity investments can also buy a seat at the board of directors’ table.  This 
would allow the Navy to have some influence in the direction of the company and thus 
the technology being developed.  This could also provide for significant cost savings 
from identifying the Navy’s required modifications to a particular product in the 
development phase vice production or post-production.  Further, having access to the 
technology as a partner would give the Navy the opportunity to test and evaluate 
technology in its own labs prior to the product reaching the commercial shelves.  This 
could decrease the overall acquisition time of getting the technology in the war-fighters’ 
hands. 
 Being involved in the venture market could also prove to be useful in engaging 
companies that may not typically do business with the government.  Many small 
companies are hesitant to do business with the government.  They may be weary of the 
bureaucracy that goes along with dealing not only with DoD, but prime contractors 
associated with the defense industry.  In addition, many small companies do not know or 
understand how to gain entry into doing business with the government.  Establishing a 
private company could provide the creditability and “cover” that is needed to gain entry 
into that portion of the innovation technology sector that is cautious in doing business 
with the government.  The private company could also give the new company credibility 
with other investors showing that the agency has some “skin in the game” and is serious 
about making a return on its investment. 
 Finally, operating a private firm would give the Navy the opportunity to establish 
a self-sustaining program.  If the company is operated correctly, it would show a profit.  
Companies that are invested in will eventually be taken public, sold, or merged with other 
companies.  This would also generate revenue.  Compensation plans can be designed to 
increase the likelihood of return on investment as is done with OnPoint or In-Q-Tel.  
After a number of years, there should be enough capital in the fund to sustain operations 
at a certain level.   
Clearly there are some advantages in the Navy’s starting a private VC company. 
However, there are also disadvantages and obstacles that will have to be overcome.  First, 
to be effective in the VC industry, the Navy must clearly define its goals for the new 
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company.  The majority of VCs specialize in only one industry (e.g. communications, IT, 
fuel cells, biomedical…).  Even if the Navy is able to spend $20 million per year in VC, 
that may still not be enough to properly establish a fund176. With best case scenario 
spending of $20 million per year, DoN leadership would have to pick one segment of 
industry on which to focus its VC initiative on.  This would require all interested parties 
to agree on a particular technology that would benefit a majority of program officers.  
With so many needs existing in the Navy today, this would be a challenge in itself.   
Second, establishing a private company carries all the risks that are carried by any 
private corporation.  There are no guarantees that any of the technologies identified will 
ever make it out of the development stage, let alone into the hands of the war-fighters.   
Another concern is once the company is formed, the Navy will have very little 
control over the actual investments being made.  The private corporation would require 
the flexibility to make investment decisions that it feels will provide the best return to the 
Navy.  This return may be in the form of ROI or technology.  Transitioning technology or 
acquiring knowledge of technology cannot be the only goal of a private company.  The 
Navy will need to develop a compensation package that allows for the firm to generate 
revenues.  This requirement is twofold.  First, for a new VC firm to be taken seriously 
and gain access to the “right” information; it will have to be driven toward profit.  VC 
firms are in the business to make money.  If a company’s only goal is to gain access to 
information, the likelihood of it being invited to participate in order to leverage other VC 
firm investments greatly decreases.  Secondly, if the company is to eventually become 
self-sufficient, it must be able to generate revenue.  With this revenue generation 
requirement, the Navy’s goals and the goals of the firm (or VC community in general) 
may conflict at times.   
Fourth, to gain creditability with other VCs, the Navy must be willing to fund the 
program at a level that will allow it to enter the market and compete with other investors.  
Although VCs rarely invest the entire fund at one time, capital also needs to readily  
 
 
176 Karthic Jayaraman, Personal Interview, June 18, 2005; Howard Strateman, Personal Interview, 
June 18, 2005; and Jason Rottenberg, Personal Interview, Jun 2005. 
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available for later round investments in funded companies, opportunity investments, and 
emergencies.  The Navy need to ensure that adequate funding is available to cover both 
of these aspects. 
Finally, with any private investment of taxpayer funds, there are political 
concerns that will need to be addressed.  Whether directly invested or through a not-for-
profit private organization, the investments made can be directly attributed to the Navy.  
If something were to go wrong with a project, the Navy must be prepared to be associated 
with the problem. 
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V. RECOMMENDED ALTERNATIVE FOR NAVY VENTURE 
CAPITAL PROGRAM 
 
 This section of the paper will address our recommendation as to what type of VC 
program the Navy should undertake if it wishes to enter the VC industry.  Much of the 
information that is put forth in this section is based on original ideas developed after 
researching the industry and interviewing numerous VC entrepreneurs, both inside and 
outside the government.  Because many of the ideas in this section are our own 
intellectual property, there will not be as many cited sources as previous sections of the 
paper.  Specific to this section, we will address the following: 
 
• Recommended Navy Approach 
• Reasoning Behind the Recommended Approach 
• How to Structure the Navy Venture Capital Office 
• Challenges in Setting up the Navy Venture Capital Office 
• Expected Benefits of the Navy Venture Capital Office 
• Recommendations on How to Market the Navy Venture Capital Office 
 
 When writing this chapter, we tried to keep the recommendations in line with the 
draft Navy VC legislation currently before Congress177.  Similar to the Army legislation 
approved by Congress, the Navy legislation would approve a certain amount of 
unobligated R&D funds to be transferred into a Navy VC fund. This funding could then 
be put to use in a “Navy VC Engagement Demonstration”. While this chapter is based on 
that legislation, the focus will be on how the Navy can implement the legislation to gain 






177 Appendix A 
A. OVERVIEW OF RECOMMENDED APPROACH 
 
 As the previous chapters of this paper stated, research indicates that there is an 
untapped market of new ideas coming out of the VC industry of which the Navy is not 
taking full advantage.  The proposed Navy legislation is significant because it recognizes 
the technology coming from the VC sector and its potential impact to the Navy.  The 
legislation is also significant because it provides the Navy a means to access the 
technology, specifically, through CRADAs.  We feel that the legislation, while an 
important step towards accessing the VC technology, does not address the additional non-
financial assets that are required to tap the VC industry, most specifically, human capital. 
 As a result of this oversight, the recommendations that will be presented center on 
the Navy creating an infrastructure which would allow it the best possible means of using 
the unobligated balances for which the legislation would provide.  The main focus of this 
infrastructure is for the Navy to reestablish a VC liaison service that was previously 
operated under the CTTO office and includes an optional provision to invest funds in 
other government VC initiatives (see Figure 12).  
 
 







B. REASONING BEHIND RECOMMENDED APPROACH 
 
 The reasoning behind the recommended approach is straight forward.  While the 
proposed legislation clearly provides the financial resources to make VC investments, 
there are still many unanswered questions regarding the Navy’s VC program. 
Specifically, our research left the following questions unanswered: 
 
• What are the Navy’s goals with VC?  Transitioning new technology or 
identifying technology? 
• Who will decide on the technology focus? 
• Who will be evaluating the technology for the Navy? 
• What office will be responsible for controlling the funds? 
• Where can the VCs go to communicate with the Navy? 
• How will the Navy identify the VC firms in a given industry? 
• If promising technology is identified, who will help transition it to the 
Navy? 
 
 While the proposed legislation starts to identify some of these issues, most 
notably by identifying the CTTO office as the office that will transition the technology, 
most of the questions remain unanswered.  As a result, the Navy must establish some 
coordination center for the Navy VC “engagement demonstration” if it is to be 
successful. 
 The first question listed is one of the most important because it establishes the 
direction of the Navy’s Venture Capital Engagement Demonstration.  The central 
question is “What is the Navy’s main goal?”  Is the objective to simply identify new 
technology coming out of the commercial sector in a cost effective manner, or is the 
Navy’s goal to transition this technology into the fleet?  Can the Navy do both? 
 Once the question on the Navy’s goals has been answered, the next question 
centers on who will decide on the Navy’s VC focus.  The VC community is segmented 
by industries.  The Navy will need an organization that understands this segmentation, 
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has contacts in the different sectors and can coordinate the Navy’s goals across the 
different sectors. Research indicates that there is currently no single office that has the 
resources and industry knowledge to do this. 
 Once the Navy has a VC goal and has identified what areas of the VC industry it 
wants to focus on, it will next need an evaluation team that is able to look at the 
technology and decide if the technology can benefit the Navy.  This team of engineers 
will need to understand the Navy’s mission and needs.  The members will need to act as 
the liaisons that seek out VC firms with promise of delivering the technology and then 
decide if the technology can benefit the Navy. 
 The fourth question revolves around who will control the funds?   If the Navy 
becomes an investor in the VC industry, then it is imperative to have one central office 
that will be in charge of the funds and distribute them based on the Navy’s needs.  These 
needs will come from the engineers identified in the previous paragraph based on input 
from SYSCOMs. 
 The fifth question is more closely aligned with the needs of the VC community.  
The VC industry is very communications orientated and will need to know how to 
contact the Navy.  The issue is more than just informal contact.  The VCs will need an 
interaction office with the Navy that will allow for direct two way communication.  This 
will be an office where the Navy can go to initiate contact with the VC community as 
well as an office where the VCs can go to market themselves to the Navy.   
 The sixth question is also a follow-on to the previous question in that it deals with 
the communication issue.  As previously stated, the VC industry is segmented by the type 
of industry invested in. VC firms further segment themselves into industry subspecialties.  
This means that the Navy will need to know who to talk to in a given industry to address 
its needs.  The Navy will need an office that knows the lay of the land in the VC world.   
 The final question that will need to be addressed is in regards to the final product 
the Navy is expecting from its VC initiative, be it transitioning VC ideas and / or 
technology to the fleet.  Research indicates that it is imperative to have an office that can 
do this.  This question is listed last because this is an all encompassing question.  This 
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final step is the end result of the Navy VC initiative and if this step cannot be properly 
executed, then the Navy should question the validity of a VC approach.178
 All of these questions point to the reasoning on why there needs to be a VC 
oversight office.  Increased funding by itself is not sufficient to establish a successful VC 
program.  The funding the Navy provides for the VC program will only be effective if 
there exists an infrastructure that can properly use the money and execute the program.  
While the appropriation language speaks to the CTTO as transitioning the VC technology 
identified, no formal business plans or proposals have been established to facilitate a 
program of this size. 
   
C. STRUCTURING THE VC OVERSIGHT OFFICE 
 
 First and foremost, our research leads us to recommend that the CTTO office be 
put in charge of any Navy VC program because of its previous dealings with the VC 
community and its expertise in transitioning technology into the fleet.  With that being 
said, this research also indicates that the current manning of the office precludes this 
organization from taking on this added responsibility.  The CTTO simply does not have 
enough personnel to properly execute a VC program. 
As of August 2005, the CTTO office had a staff of four with an annual budget of 
approximately $1,000,000.179  If the proposed legislation is approved and allows the 
Navy to use $20,000,000 of unobligated balances for a VC initiative, the added 
responsibility of managing the funds and the VC program may exceed the CTTO’s 
capabilities.  As such, we recommend expanding the CTTO to include a VC Oversight 
organization.  The notional mission of this organization is depicted in Figure 13.  
 
178 It is worth noting that this problem was briefly addressed in the Navy legislation by stating that 
this would fall under the CTTO’s area of responsibility.   








 This proposed office could fall under the CTTO’s area of responsibility and 
would supplement the current staff.  To operate this VC office, we recommend a staff of 
four civilian personnel with the option of including two active duty personnel.  The 
civilian personnel should all be senior civil servants who have an engineering 
background.  An ideal candidate would also be someone who has experience dealing with 
small businesses and knowledge of how VC works.  Interviews conducted with the 
CTTO suggest that the best candidate would have held the role of Science Advisor to the 
fleets or a program manager for an acquisition program.  These two positions were 
identified because of the traits these positions required and the experience gained from 
these positions would add value to the VC Oversight Office. 
The civilians that would compose the Navy VC Oversight office would have 
diverse duties.  While the CTTO would decide on the work breakdown for the office, we 
have recommended the following chart as one possible way to structure the VC Oversight 







Department Head  







Surface Tech Sub  / I Tech VC@Sea Tech 
Responsibilities: Responsibilities: Responsibilities: 
Surface Technology Subsurface Technology 
Information Technology 
VC@Sea Program 
Acquisition Specialist Public Affairs 
Budget Coordinator 
Figure 14.   Proposed VC Oversight Office Structure 
 
 When assigning jobs to the personnel in this office, the initial idea would be to 
have each member focus on one or two warfare areas.  This would not only allow each 
team member the ability to develop relationships with technology firms in the respective 
fields of interest to the warfare areas, but also develop specific knowledge of the needs of 
the Navy in that warfare area.   
 In addition to the civilian personnel, it is also recommend that two active duty 
personnel work with the VC Oversight Office.  The logic behind this recommendation is 
that the Sailors and Marines will be the end-users of any technology identified by the VC 
Oversight Office and it would be useful to have a user’s perspective on the Navy’s needs 
and how possible technology could fill these needs.  We understand that it will be 
impossible to have two active duty personnel represent all the views of the Navy and 
Marine Corps but in that most of the technology will be late stage technology, the active 
duty end users should be represented.  In selecting the active duty representatives, the 
ideal candidate would be someone coming off an operational tour who has an engineering 
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background and possibly an MBA.180  It is also recommended that the candidates be Line 
Officers for the Navy or Combat Arms Officers for the Marine Corps and be at least an 
O-3.181  One possible option on how these two personnel could be assigned to this office 
would be though an internship sponsored by the Naval Postgraduate School.  This 
program could be set up similar to the NPS Operations Research program’s internships 
and allow for post operational tour personnel working on a master’s degree to gain 




 The proposed VC Oversight Office would have the following three main focuses 
with many responsibilities denoted under each focus area: 
1. General Oversight and Administration of VC program 
2. Reestablish and manage the VC@Sea program 
3. Allow for (and manage) investments in current government VC programs 
such as OnPoint or In-Q-Tel 
 The first focus area, general oversight and administration of the Navy’s VC 
initiative, is the most broad and most important to the overall health of the program.  The 
responsibilities under this focus would entail the following: 
• Creating a business plan that aligns the goals of the VC initiative to the 
Navy’s needs 
• Managing the VC budget 




180 We recommend an MBA because it provides a set of analytical tools for business and management 
decision making to the user which when combined with an engineering background, provides the best skill 
set for the VC industry. 
181 While the ideal candidate would be a line officer, we also feel that selected Staff or Combat 
Service Officers would qualify if they had operational experience.  In most cases, we also see the 
candidates being an O-4 but understand it may be difficult to get an O-4 to fill such a billet.  
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• Evaluating VC firms identified by the VC@Sea program (to be discussed 
in the following section), their business plans and their technology and 
provide additional funding to assist in transitioning the technology if 
feasible. 
 As with any VC program, location proves to be a critical aspect and this holds 
true for this office as well.  As such, it is recommended that this office be located in 
California because of the proximity to the VC industry and the numerous Naval assets 
located throughout the state.  As stated in Chapter II, California is the leader in VC 
investments. In 2004, $9.5 billion out of a total $21 billion (or 45%) of total VC 
investments were invested in California.  The next largest percentage of VC funds 
invested by state was Massachusetts which had $2.7 billion or almost 13% of total VC 
investments.182  Possible locations for this office in California include Silicon Valley 
(San Jose and surrounding areas), Monterey (as an institute at the Naval Postgraduate 
School) or San Diego.   
 Initially, it may seem that creating a new office within the CTTO but not located 
in close proximity to the CTTO would be a mistake.  Research indicates that there is 
greater benefit to establishing an office located in close proximity to the VC firms thus 
helping to facilitate communication with the VC firms and technology companies.  
Research has also shown that VC firms are very interactive and as such require 
significant attention from the investors and directors.  As noted in the first section of this 
paper, Gompers and Lerner have also come to this conclusion by noting that “more than 
half the firms have a venture director with an office within sixty miles of their 
headquarters, while 25 percent of the firms have a venture director within seven 
miles183.” If the Navy wants to actively participate within the VC industry, it must create 
an office in such a location that will contribute to this interaction.  Placing the new VC 




182 National Venture Capital Association Yearbook, New York: Thomson Venture Economics 
Information, 2005.  
183 Paul A. Gompers, and Joshua  Lerner, The Venture Capital Cycle, Cambridge Mass: MIT P, 1999.  
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locating the office in California, the VC Oversight Office would require less traveling 
resulting in greater efficiency due to reduced travel expenses and more time available for 
researching technologies. 
 At this point, it is also worth reminding the reader that it is recommend the VC 
Oversight Office fall under the CTTO because of the core competency that the CTTO 
has in identifying technology and transitioning that technology to the Navy.  The CTTO 
is not an oversight office for the VC Oversight program, but an office that already has 
the knowledge required to start the program.  As such, the VC Oversight office does not 
need to be co-located with the current CTTO. 
 The second focus area of the VC Oversight Office would be to reestablish the 
VC@Sea program which was previously the responsibility of the CTTO.  This program 
was a great benefit to the Navy because it allowed the Navy to identify technologies 
coming out of the VC community by allowing the VC companies to see how the Navy 
operates. Responsibilities under this focus area include the following: 
 
• Reestablishing the VC@Sea program 
• Scheduling one to two VC@Sea visits a year  
• Identifying potential VC firms that may have technology of interest to the 
Navy 
 
 The VC@Sea program would be the first step in transitioning technology or ideas 
to the Navy.  The program would act as the liaison service that convinces the VCs to talk 
to the Navy.  Once the technology has been identified through the VC@Sea program, 
then the VC Oversight Office would further evaluate the technology to see if the 
technology meets the Navy’s requirements as is or if the technology could be adapted to 
meet the Navy’s needs and required bridge funding to do so.   
 The VC@Sea program will be critical to getting the VC firms to talk to the Navy.  
Because of this, taking the VCs out to sea in a sort of TIGER cruise would go a long way 
towards establishing good will.  A portion of the unobligated balances would be used to 
pay for the VC@Sea program.  The majority of the costs for the program are expected to 
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come from transportation costs associated with transporting the personnel to and from 
the ships.  Since most VC firms are located on the west coast, it makes sense to assume 
that most VC@Sea events should take place with 3rd Fleet ships.184  This means that the 
VC@Sea program would need to closely align the program with 3rd Fleet’s operations 
office in addition to the VCs expected to participate. 
 The final focus area of the VC Oversight Office could best be thought of as an 
optional focus, but one that we feel is important to consider.  The VC Oversight Office 
should have the option of investing money in established Government sponsored VC 
programs such as In-Q-Tel or OnPoint as an additional way to gain access to new 
technology.  These investments could be in coordination with established technology 
focuses that these firms have already invested in, or could be a new focus based on 
technology needs the Navy identified.  These investments could compliment the 
VC@Sea program.  Whereas the VC@Sea program would be an all encompassing 
overview of technology, investing in an already established VC firm could allow the 
Navy to focus on one specific industry.   
 There are numerous benefits that this type of investment could bring to the VC 
Oversight Office.  The first benefit is that it would allow the VC Oversight Office to 
enter relationships with VC portfolio companies as investors as opposed to customers 
through the investment firm.  Under the VC@Sea program, the Navy would be a 
potential customer to the VC firms.  While the customer relationship would still allow 
the Navy to identify technology, that relationship would not give the Navy access to all 
of the information about the technology that the investors have access too.  This 
additional information could also include industry information as well as information 




184 Since most VC firms are located in California, the majority of VC@Sea programs would most 
likely be held within 3rd Fleet.  This, however, does not mean that 3rd Fleet will be the exclusive host of 
the program.  It should also be possible to host an event on the east coast as well if there is enough interest 
with east coast VCs. 
 96
                                                
 A second benefit of these types of investments is that it would allow the Navy a 
way to make equity investments at a significantly reduced cost when compared to 
starting its own VC Company.  These reduced costs would result from the following 
reasons: 
1. Reduced overhead 
2. Leveraging of existing investments 
3. Possibility of reduced management fees based on investments 
 First, the equity investments made though an existing fund would make use of 
existing facilities and resources meaning that the Navy would not need to provide the 
start up capital required to establish such a program.  Second, if the Navy chose, it could 
invest in existing technology focuses and leverage its equity investments off of current 
investments already placed in the industry.  This would allow for more investments to be 
made in a given industry and therefore, increase the possibility of investing in a firm that 
becomes profitable. 
 The third cost reduction, when compared to creating a Navy specific VC 
Company, is that in many cases, the Navy could benefit from a declining management 
fee schedule that is present in such firms as OnPoint.185  A declining management fee 
schedule means that as more funds are invested in the VC company, the percentage of 
the committed funds that are deducted as a management fee are reduced.  (See figure 15)  
For example, if the Navy were to invest an additional $10 million into OnPoint, then the 
management fee paid would only be on the $10 million invested and would be based on 
the allocated amount at the end of the fee schedule. 
 
 
185 Jason Rottenberg, personal interview, Jun 2005.  







$0 $20 $40 $60 $80 $100 $120 $140 $160









Figure 15.   Declining Management Fee Example 
 
 If the VC oversight office chooses this option, then it would be responsible for 
identifying the industry sector in which it wanted to invest, and coordinating such 
investments with the respective VC program.  Such investments will require significant 
capital outlays so the VC Oversight Office would need to consider this when planning its 
budget.  The VC Oversight Office would also need to work with the VC firms once the 
technology is identified and help transition it to the Navy.  If the goal of this investment 
is to simply identify technology, then the VC Oversight Office would need to assist in 
communicating the technology back to the CTTO and ONR.  Again, the role will be to 
liaison between the Navy and the VC firms.  Finally, the Navy will need to consider 
approval issues.  These approval issues mean that the Navy would need to clear such 
investments through the VC firm’s board of trustees, the VC firm’s representative 
organization (Army for OnPoint or CIA for In-Q-Tel), and possibly Congress.186
 
F. EXPECTED BENEFITS OF A NAVY VENTURE CAPITAL OFFICE 
 
 The proposed structure of the Navy VC initiative as described previously allows 
for the following benefits when combined with the drafted legislation: 
                                                 
186 Many of the benefits and considerations involving possible Navy investments in established 
government VC firms were identified during an interview with Mr. Jason Rottenberg on 21 Sep. 2005 
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• Provides infrastructure to allow unobligated balances to be put to best use 
• Provides an avenue for VC firms and the Navy to communicate needs and 
technology 
• Provides the Navy a means to gain access to new technology and transition 
technology to the fleet in a cost effective manner 
• Allows the Navy to leverage off technology developed for the private sector. 
• Eliminates the need for the Navy to establish its own VC corporation in 
order to gain access to new technology 
• Provides the Navy the flexibility to identify technology across many sectors 
and transition specific technology to meet the fleet’s needs 
• Provides an avenue to invest in other Government VC programs to 
supplement the technology identified though the VC@Sea program 
 The biggest benefit of such a program is that it provides the Navy a means to put 
the unobligated balances that the Navy legislation proposes to the best use.  Without a 
dedicated infrastructure, the Navy currently does not have the means to properly employ 
the unobligated balances.  If the proposed legislation is passed and the Navy does get 
access to the unobligated balances, we have found no business plan that specifies how 
the funds will be used.  As such, our proposed program would allow a specific office to 
coordinate the Navy VC effort. 
 The second biggest benefit of such a program is that it would provide the Navy 
with the means to communicate its needs to a new market, and one that has, for the most 
part, remained untapped.  As the first section of this paper described, the VC industry 
has been responsible for numerous innovations in recent years.  The current Navy 
acquisition structure fails to identify this market.  A Navy VC Oversight Office when 
combined with funding to support the office could establish a dialogue with the VC 
industry.  The dialogue with this industry is an important first step in identifying new 
technology. 
 The third benefit, closely related to the second, is that the proposed program could 
provide a means to identify and transition technology.  Currently, the Navy acquisition 
system operates by identifying needs and seeing if internal capabilities exist that meet 
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the needs.  If they do not, then the acquisition process starts by going to the private 
sector to develop a technology to meet the requirements previously identified.  The 
proposed program of creating a VC Oversight Office attacks this problem in a much 
different way.  Instead of identifying needs internally, by inviting VC firms to the fleet to 
observe how we operate and then asking them “What do you have that will allow us to 
do our jobs better?”, the Navy now would have a new group of people who could 
identifying technology for them.  This is a revolutionary way of attacking an old 
problem. 
 The fourth benefit of such a program is that it could allow the Navy to leverage 
technology being developed for the commercial sector.  Much of what the Navy does has 
a close parallel in the private sector.  From database management to healthcare to 
wireless networks, many of the problems that the Navy is facing are also problems for 
private sector companies.  The VC firms that invest in companies developing solutions 
to these problems could find a new market for the technology in the Navy.  The Navy, in 
turn, would have access to people who are already addressing problems the Navy is 
facing.  The Navy VC Oversight Office would provide a means to communicate with 
companies developing solutions to problems facing not only the private sector, but the 
Navy as well. 
 The fifth benefit is that our program would give the Navy the ability to 
communicate with the VC community without establishing its own VC company.  While 
the Army (through OnPoint) and the CIA (through In-Q-Tel) have been successful in 
accessing the VC industry through their own internally established VC company, 
research indicates that starting a Navy specific VC would require a substantial increase 
to the funds being considered for this type of program.187   Calculations shown in 
Appendix B highlight this point in more detail and show that while the average VC fund 
size in 2004 was around $155 million, the technologies that the Navy is interested in are 
associated with significantly larger funds.   Because of this, the Navy must find new 
ways to access this market and our program provides a means to do this.   
 
187 Appendix B 
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 The sixth benefit of the model is that it is designed to be flexible.  The proposed 
Navy VC Oversight Office would act much like a tool box that has numerous tools the 
Navy could use to identify and transition technologies to the Navy.  These tools include, 
but are not limited to, the VC@Sea Program to identify technologies, the engineering 
team to evaluate the technologies and provide opinions, CRADAs to provide funding to 
further develop the technologies, the VC Oversight Office to provide liaison services and 
the option to invest in other Government VC programs as an additional means to new 
technology.  The Navy VC Oversight Office would also allow the Navy to decide on its 
technology focus and not be limited to one specific industry sector.   
 If, on the other hand, the Navy does want to focus on a specific sector, the model 
would allow for the Navy VC Oversight Office to invest in other government VC firms 
that have specific focuses such as OnPoint within the power and energy industry or In-
Q-Tel within the computer and database management sectors.  As opposed to starting a  
specific VC company to do this, the Navy could leverage off of other firms to gain 
access to the technology.  Again, this would provide another avenue for investments and 
increases flexibility. 
 
G. CHALLENGES IN ESTABLISHING A NAVY VC OVERSIGHT OFFICE 
 
 With the reasoning for the Navy VC program and the benefits of such an 
approach already established, this section will address the challenges the Navy (or more 
specifically the CTTO) will face in trying to establish such a program.  Specifically, the 
following issues will be addressed: 
• Organizational Roadblocks 
o Developing a Business Plan 
o Funding 





                                                
1. Organizational Roadblocks 
 
 Currently, the CTTO is a small office with a staff of four and an annual budget of 
approximately $1 million dollars.188  If this office were to be expanded and given a new 
budget representing up to $20 million in new funding, other offices may try to gain 
access to the funding.  This could make if difficult for any program to succeed if there is 
not guidance on to whom the funding would specifically go. 
 These organizational conflicts could also cause problems in trying to define a 
business plan for the VC Oversight Office.189  A well defined business plan is one of the 
most important aspects for the Navy VC Oversight Office to establish early on because it 
would guide the direction of the Navy VC program.  This business plan will need to align 
with the mission of ONR in such a way that it adds to ONR’s mission without 
overlapping with ONR current programs.   
 
2. Financial Considerations 
 
 Aside from internal frictions, the financial considerations will be another obstacle 
in properly executing a Navy VC program.  Initially, it may seem that the legislation will 
address this aspect of the program, but the proposed legislation can be left open to 
interpretation which could slow the Navy VC program down considerably.  The first 
issue involves how the money can be used.  As previously identified, the proposal 
specifies that the funding will be made available for a “Navy Venture Capital 
Engagement demonstration,” but does not clarify in significant detail, how the program 
 
188 WindyJoy Springs, personal interview, 16 Sep. 2005. 
189 The following section of the paper will go into more detail on how the Navy VC Oversight Office 
should approach the development of a business plan.  This section is only meant to identify the business 
plan as one of the challenges that must be overcome if the office is to succeed. 
should be carried out.190  If the CTTO does get jurisdiction over the Navy VC program, 
then the next problem becomes how it could use the funds to support such a program.   
 Previously in this paper, it was identified how the CTTO office could be 
expanded to carry out the expanded mission of a Navy VC program.  How the CTTO 
could cover the cost of the additional resources required is not clear.  The table on the 
following page (Table 2) depicts the notional costs to run the Navy VC Oversight Office 




                                                
 
Table 2. Estimated Expenses for a Notional VC Oversight Office 
Category     Cost 
Funding for 4 FTE191 Salary 
40% 
Benefits192   
1 GS-15 $128,383 $51,353.20 $179,736 
3 GS-14 $109,142 $43,656.80 $458,396 
Travel for Staff193     $200,000 
Rent for Office194 1300 sq ft @ $3900 / mo $46,800 
Utilities $500 / mo   $6,000 
Support Costs195 $2000 / mo   $24,000 
Total196     $914,933 
   
 
190 Appendix A. The draft legislation states that the Navy will use a three part process which involves 
identifying technology though the Navy Research Advisory Council (NRAC), have funds set aside to test 
emerging technology identified by the NRAC, and transition the technology to the Navy through the 
CTTO.  We feel that this legislation may be too vague because it does not identify who will be overseeing 
the process and controlling the funds.   
191 Based on the locality pay area of San Jose; Source: http://www.opm.gov/oca/05tables/html/sf.asp
192 40% estimated based on NPS budgeted costs for civilian benefits; Source: Mr. Jeff Rothel 
193 Estimate seven trips per year per employee to visit VC portfolio companies, System Commands 
(SYSCOMS) and scout technology.  Also includes travel associated with VC@Sea program; Source: Ms. 
WindyJoy Springs 
194 Estimate based on rental rates for office space in Palo Alto area. Source:   
Jocelyn Dong "Space Available." Palo Alto Weekly 16 Feb. 2005. 10 Oct. 2005 
<http://www.paloaltoonline.com/weekly/morgue/2005/2005_02_16.office16.shtml>. 
195 Support Costs consist of office supplies, marketing material, phone bills and other operational 
expenses. 
196 Figure does not include one time costs to establish office such as copier, computers, phones and 
office furniture.   
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 While it is relatively easy to develop estimates for the cost, it is less clear as to 
how these costs can be covered.  The draft appropriation allows for the unobligated 
balances to be used as general RDT&E funds consistent with the regulations governing 
the use of such funds.  The DODFMR Vol. 2A specifies the following regarding the use 
of such funds: 
DODFMR Vol. 2A 010213(B)(1)197  
a. RDT&E will finance research, development, test and evaluation efforts 
performed by contractors and government installations, including 
procurement of end items, weapons, equipment, components, materials 
and services required for development of equipment, material, or 
computer application software; its Development Test and Evaluation 
(DT&E); and its Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E) as provided for 
in paragraph C.5. (Test Articles and Test Support) below.  
b. The operation of R&D installations and activities engaged in the 
conduct of R&D programs, including direct and indirect efforts, expense 
and investment costs.  
DODFMR Vol. 2A 010213(B)(2)198  
d. Expenses of Headquarters R&D management, organizational 
management analyses, test and evaluation for system sustainment 
personnel and command support, and product improvement within the 
current performance envelope for systems out of production will be 
funded in the Operation and Maintenance (O&M) appropriations. 
 At first glance, it would appear that the Navy VC Oversight Office would be 
classified under DODFMR Vol. 2A 010213(B)(2)(d).  Under this classification, 
appropriated Operations and Maintenance funding would be required to fund such costs.  
Upon further research, it appears that the funds provided for a Navy VC demonstration 
would fall under DODFMR Vol. 2A 010213(B)(1) and as such, would be available to 
cover the cost of operation for a Navy Venture Capital Oversight Office.  These funds  
 
                                                 
197United States, Office of the Under Secretary of Defensse (Comptroller), Department of Defense, 
Department of Defense Financial Management Regulations, Oct. 2005, 30 Oct. 2005 
<http://www.dod.mil/comptroller>.   
198 United States, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), Department of Defense, 
Department of Defense Financial Management Regulations, Oct. 2005, 30 Oct. 2005 
<http://www.dod.mil/comptroller>.   
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could be used for this purpose in accordance with the Financial Management Policy 
Manual Section 075403, p 3-195 and Title 10; Subtitle C; Part I; Chapter 503 § 
5023(a)(1-3) which states: 199
 
(a) Sums appropriated for the Office of Naval Research may be used to 
pay the cost of performing its duties under section 5022 of this title 
including the cost of—  
 
 (1) administration; 
 (2) conduct of research and development work in Government  
 facilities; and 
 (3) conduct of research and development work under contracts  
 with individuals, corporations, and educational or scientific  
 institutions. 
 Having these funds available for the Navy VC Oversight Office overcomes, what 
could have been, a serious hurdle for such a program.  With this clarification, the VC 
Oversight Office could create a budget to cover the costs and use any remaining funding 
to research VC firms and transition technology.  Now, the subject of funding must 
transition from how the funds could be used to accountability on the part of the VC 
Oversight Office to properly use the funds.  While the VC Oversight Office should have a 
great amount of flexibility in using these funds, both ONR and the CTTO need to 
establish metrics to guide the VC Oversight Office in the use of the funds prior to 




                                                 
199 United States, House of Representatives, Title 10 United States Code 5023c(I)(503), 12 July 2005, 
1 Sep. 2005 <http://straylight.law.cornell.edu>. 
200 The topic of measuring how the funds are to be used and the resulting benefits are a subject that 
goes beyond the scope of this paper.  For this section, we are listing this as something for ONR and the 
CTTO to consider prior to entering a Navy VC demonstration.  The subject of metrics that can be 
implemented for the VC Oversight Office are a possible topic for follow on research. 
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H. RECOMMENDATIONS ON HOW TO MARKET THE NAVY VC 
OVERSIGHT OFFICE 
  
 The biggest challenge in establishing the Navy VC Oversight Office at this stage 
is not the funding or financing challenges, but convincing all interested parties that this is 
the right course of action for the Navy.  VC is currently a hot topic not just in DoD, but 
the entire government.  Over the past year, government involvement in the VC industry 
has attracted much attention, as evidenced by a Wall Street Journal article on In-Q-Tel 
published on September 12, 2005.201  This attention seems to make the policymakers 
nervous about any government interaction with the VC community. 
 Even with the outside political sensitivity being noted, research indicates that 
there are three directions in which the Navy needs to market the Navy VC program; one 
directed internally at the Navy, one directed to political interests, and one directed at the 
VC industry. The following provides recommendations on how to market the Navy’s VC 
Oversight Office allowing buy in from all stakeholders. 
  
1. Marketing the Navy VC Program Internally 
 
 The first topic that will be addressed is the internal marketing challenges 
specifically directed at ONR.  If the proposed legislation is approved and the CTTO 
receives additional funds, there will be some discussion within ONR as to who will 
control the money.  The first marketing goal should be focused on identifying the VC 
Oversight Office’s mission within ONR and the CTTO.  The objective of this marketing 
should be to identify all interested parties so the VC Oversight Office is not duplicating 
efforts of existing ONR programs.  The best way to do this is by creating a business plan 
for the VC Oversight Office and discussing the plan with senior ONR officials.   
 The business plan will be the first step in identifying the VC Oversight Office’s 
mission and establishing good will in ONR.  The business plan will need to focus on the 
VC Oversight Office’s mission and make sure that the mission does not interfere with 
 
201 Jay Solomon, "Intelligence Investing," The Wall Street Journal 12 Sep 2005, sec. A: 4. 
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other ONR activity.  When briefing the business plan, the VC Oversight Office can also 
get input from the ONR officials on technology focus areas it feels the VC program 
should focus on, and ask if there are missions where current ONR research can benefit 
from VC technology.   
 It is important to remember that the VC Oversight Office would act as a liaison 
between the VC companies and the Navy.  One of the main interaction points within the 
Navy will be ONR so it is important that the Navy VC program stay aligned with ONR.  
We believe that this program can facilitate alignment of goals between the CTTO and 
ONR with respect to developing a VC program that meets the needs of the Navy. The 
VC program should reinforce the idea that it is not competing with the traditional ONR 
mission, but supplementing the mission to bring more technology to the table. 
 
2. Marketing to Political Interests 
 
 The second marketing program which must be considered is marketing the VC 
Oversight Office to political interests.  This needs to be considered because it was 
congressional verbiage in the 2003 House Appropriations Act that directed “the Assistant 
Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition, and the Director of 
the Office of Naval Research to jointly prepare a report for the Committee which 
examines whether the Navy could benefit from establishing a pilot venture capital fund to 
enable program managers to take advantage of higher risk technology developments in a 
rapid fashion without fear of penalty to their existing programs.”202  The verbiage goes 
on to recommend a study of a program similar to the In-Q-Tel model in addition to other 
private VC models for implementation in the Navy. 
 Because of the congressional interest in the Navy program, the Navy must be 
ready to market its program to Congress.  Based on the 2003 Appropriations Bill which 
directed the Navy to study a VC program, it can be understood that Congress was looking 
for a Navy specific VC company similar to the OnPoint model which represents the 
 
202 Jerry  Lewis, United States, Cong. House, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, 107 Cong., 2nd sess., 
532, 25 June 2003, 27 Oct. 2005 <http://www.thomas.loc.gov>.  
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Army. In that we are not recommending such an approach to VC for the Navy, the Navy 
must be ready to defend its program to Congress. 
 The best way for the Navy to market the VC Oversight Office is to focus on the 
uniqueness of the program.  The model we are presenting in this section is not a copy of 
an existing model, but one that would be uniquely suited to the Navy’s needs.  The VC 
Oversight model could bring all of the benefits of a Navy specific VC firm with more 
flexibility that would allow the Navy a greater degree of control over the technology 
focus.  This added flexibility will stem from the tools available to the VC Oversight 
Office to include CRADAs, Nonrecurring Engineering funding, and Equity Investments 
though OnPoint or In-Q-Tel.  The added controls will be the result of the ONR (though 
the VC Oversight Office and the CTTO) controlling the funding.   
 The focus of marketing to political interests must address the benefits the program 
can bring to the Navy in relation to the Navy’s goals of identifying technology and then 
transitioning promising technology to the Navy.  The CTTO had a great track record of 
transitioning technology as evidenced by its 55 deals completed through 21 March 
2005.203  The Navy will need to stress this previous success and then show how the VC 
Oversight Office will build on this success with the additional resources the proposed 
legislation would bring.  
 
3. Marketing to the Private Sector 
 
 The third and final marketing challenge will be an external marketing program 
directed at the VC firms.  This mission will fall more in line with the traditional picture 
of marketing because its goal will be to inform a specific population about a service that 
the Navy is offering.  It will require the Navy’s VC program to define a target market, 
inform the target market, communicate the Navy’s mission to the target market, and 
establish relationships with firms in the target market with the hopes that both parties 
will be better off for having engaged one another.  It can be assumed that most small, 
 
203 Michael McGrath "Alternatives for Increased Navy Participation with the Venture Capital 
Community." Assistant Secretary of the Navy (RDA). Pentagon, Washington DC. 21 Mar. 2005. 
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private VC firms will have concerns about working with the Navy and this will be the 
most difficult hurdle to overcome.204  As such, the best way for the Navy to approach 
this problem is to structure the Navy VC program as a type of “business”. 
 This “business” will not be a traditional business, but instead would allow the 
Navy to structure the VC Oversight Office in such a way that it resembles a business.  
This will be the best way to get interaction among the VC firms and market the program 
to the private sector business in a way they can understand.  The following section 
describes our recommendation on how to accomplish this. 
 
I. THE VECTOR MODEL 
 
 Our recommendation is for the Navy VC Oversight office to be called VeCTOR 
for Venture Capital Technology Transition for Operational Requirements.  As stated 
earlier in this chapter, it is recommended that the VeCTOR office be established 
somewhere on the West Coast to allow for more interaction among the VC firms.  
Possible locations include San Diego, Monterey, or San Jose.  The physical office will 
play a big part in how the program is interpreted by the VC community.  The best case 
scenario is a location that allows the VC firms to come by to present their technology in 
a business setting.  The location also needs to encourage the VeCTOR personnel to 
conduct site visits with VC firms. 
 Once a location is established, the VeCTOR team needs to be proactive in 
informing the VC industry about the program.  It can do this through trade shows, 
industry magazines and publications such as Red Herring and The Wall Street Journal, 





204 Based on interviews conducted with numerous VC fund directors.   
205 While it may seem optimistic to assume that financial publications such as Red Herring or The 
Wall Street Journal may be interested in the Navy’s model, there has been much attention in recent times to 
government interaction in the VC community.  Based on this interest, we feel that the Navy may be 
featured in such publications. 
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mouth seems to be the way to get things done and VeCTOR needs to capitalize on 
this.206  One or two deals with a few big VC firms would get the word around quickly 
about the program.   
 VeCTOR will also need to have publications describing itself to the target market.  
These publications need to describe the VeCTOR model, how VeCTOR interacts with 
the Navy, on how to market products to VeCTOR and the potential market that VeCTOR 
represents.   
 The last point is very important because it means that the Navy needs to 
understand its customer. The venture capitalists are first and foremost, business 
personnel.  They are not in it for the technology.  They will be looking for a market for 
their product and VeCTOR will need to convince them that the Navy is a big enough and 
suitable potential market for them.   
 Finally, one of the biggest marketing tools that VeCTOR will have will be the 
VC@Sea program.  VeCTOR will need to realize that the VC@Sea program is more 
than just a way to identify potential technology.  Much like the Navy does with its 
recruiting ads, VeCTOR needs to market the VC@Sea program as an exciting trip which 
can show the VC firms the market that VeCTOR represents.   
 The VC@Sea program is unique in that it will allow the VC firms to get a first 
hand look at what the Navy does and how both parties can benefit from the interaction.  
The Navy can identify and get access to new technology, while the VC firms may be 
able to secure additional research funding and gain access to a new, largely untapped 
market.  This represents a huge marketing opportunity that VeCTOR must use to its 
advantage.   
 
206 Karthic Jayarman, personal interview, 18 June 2005; Howard Strateman, personal interview, 18 



























                                                
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
 The original Navy VC idea was first introduced by Congress in the 2003 House 
Appropriations Bill.  In that bill, the Committee directed “the Assistant Secretary of the 
Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition and the Director of Naval Research to 
jointly prepare a report for the Committee which examines whether the Navy could 
benefit from establishing a pilot Venture Capital fund to enable program managers to 
take advantage of higher risk technology developments in a rapid fashion without fear or 
penalty to existing programs.”207  Since that report was published, there has been a fair 
amount of research done on the subject of establishing a Navy VC program.  This 
research includes not only the original report, but DoN interaction with the Navy 
Research Advisory Counsel Venture Capital (NRAC VC) Panel chaired by Dr. Mark 
Lister and this report.   
 Even with all of the research completed up to this point, there still appears to be 
no consensus as to what course of action the Navy should undertake.  On July 13, 2005, 
the NRAC VC panel had its “final” meeting with the Navy’s leadership where it put forth 
it’s recommendation on how the Navy should proceed with the VC engagement 
demonstration.  Overall, the panel recommended that the Navy not undertake a VC 
program because the goals were too undefined and there were no firm resources that 
could be dedicated to the project.   
 While the NRAC VC Panel did not support the Navy entering a VC program, the 
research presented in this paper takes a different view.  As the result of thinking about the 
Navy VC program as a program that does not need to fit in the traditional VC mold, we 
have actually expanded on the NRAC VC Panel’s conclusion.  The recommendations 
presented in this paper differ from those of the NRAC VC Panel with respect to overall 




207 United States, Cong. House, Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, 2003, 107th Cong., 2nd 
sess., 532, 25 June 2003, 9 Oct. 2005 <http://thomos.loc.gov>.  
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A. NAVY INVOLVEMENT IN VC 
  
 The ideas presented in this paper obviously support the Navy undertaking a VC 
program.  How did the research presented here lead to this conclusion when research 
conducted at the same time by actual venture capitalists reaches an entirely different 
conclusion?  The first answer is that the research presented in this paper did not come to 
an entirely different conclusion.  With respect to the Navy starting a Navy specific VC 
firm, both the NRAC VC Panel and this paper recommend against it.  Where this paper 
does differ from the NRAC VC Panel is that it recommends Navy involvement in the VC 
industry, albeit, though a different model than traditionally used in VC. 
 The benefit of this research is that beyond recommending that the Navy should 
enter the VC industry, it recommends a model that can fill the Navy’s needs with respect 
to VC and, hopefully, accomplish the Navy’s objectives.  The model presented is unique 
to the Navy and specifically tailored to meet the Navy’s VC goals while adhering to the 
proposed legislative language.  The model is not a typical VC model and as such, may 
not have been considered by the NRAC VC Panel.  
 
B. THE VENTURE CAPITAL INDUSTRY 
 
 Before recommending what action the Navy should take with respect to VC, the 
first objective of this paper was to define VC.  Over the course of the past ten years, the 
VC community has received a great amount of publicity.  From the technology boom of 
the late 1990’s to the “dot com” crash in 2000-2001, VC has been on a roller coaster ride 
that the market watchers have been following.  All of this attention and publicity seems to 
have had the effect of blurring the definition of VC to the public.  Because of this, 
Chapter II of this paper was dedicated to defining the VC industry and understanding 
how it operates.  That chapter covered the history of VC, the performance of VC firms, 
how VC firms are structured, how VC firms are compensated, how VC firms invest 
money, how VC firms oversee investments and how VC firms exit investments.  
 One of the main ways research was accomplished for this section was going out 
and speaking with venture capitalists outside the government’s influence.  It was 
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important to get a feel for the industry beyond what academic papers and books on the 
subject could provide.  While most of the cited sources in Chapter II do come from 
published works, the information gained by conducting visits with venture capitalists 
helped conceptualize the VC industry to understand how the Navy’s goals could relate to 
the industry.  From this point, the next step in the research was addressing government 
involvement with the VC industry. 
 
C. GOVERNMENT VENTURE CAPITAL INITIATIVES 
 
 While the Navy currently does not have a dedicated VC program, numerous 
government programs have attempted to tap into the VC community.  Chapter III of this 
paper focused on identifying the government initiatives that work with (or have worked 
with) the VC industry, or firms that are targeted by VC companies.  This chapter was 
intended to assist the reader in identifying the Navy’s objectives with VC by identifying 
other DoD initiatives that had similar objectives and analyzing the results.  Another 
benefit of this chapter is that it identified potential models that the Navy could use if a 
decision was made to develop its own VC program. 
 Site visits were also conducted with active government VC initiatives.  These site 
visits included: 
• In-Q-Tel – The CIA’s VC program 
• OnPoint – The Army’s VC program 
• CTTO – The Navy’s Commercial Technology Transition Office 
• DeVenCI – Defense Venture Catalyst Initiative 
The real benefit of these visits is that they solidified the goals of the government agencies 
with respect to VC and showed how the government VC programs attempted to align 
these goals with the programs.  Once the industry and the government VC initiatives 





D. OPTIONS FOR NAVY INVOLVEMENT IN VENTURE CAPITAL 
 
 Chapter IV focused internally on the Navy.  The question was, should the Navy 
enter the VC community, and if it should, what models could be presented that would 
allow it to do so?  In order to answer these questions, the research first had to focus on 
what are the Navy’s technology needs and whether VC could assist the Navy with these 
needs.  This seemingly straight-forward question turns out to be extremely complex.  
This complexity stems from the sheer size of the Navy and its mission and how the 
missions are interpreted by different organization within the Navy.  
 For some organizations, the Navy’s technology needs are to transition 
forthcoming technology not visible to the Navy from the commercial sector to the fleet.  
To others, the goal is to simply learn about technology being developed in the 
commercial sector and see if the technology holds value to the Navy.  While these 
objectives seem similar, they are quite different in how they align with the VC 
community’s objectives.   
 The good news is that this research did identify a common thread within the 
Navy, that being technology identification.  The bad news is that corporate VC models do 
not align with just technology identification.  This seems to be the point where the NRAC 
VC Panel came to its conclusion. This is also the point where this paper expanded the 
definition of Navy VC involvement by presenting models other than starting a Navy 
specific VC firm. The NRAC VC Panel and this research both agree that if technology 
identification is the only common goal, there are better ways to do it than by starting a 
VC firm.   
 
E. RECOMMENDED ALTERNATIVE FOR THE NAVY VENTURE 
CAPITAL PROGRAM 
 
 With the differences up to this point accounted for, Chapter V presents the 
recommended approach to a Navy VC program.  This chapter holds real value to the 
Navy because it contains recommendations as to how the Navy could enter VC.  
Research on the Navy VC program, to date, has not provided a recommended way for the 
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Navy to enter VC other than through vague guidance in Congressional legislation.  The 
objective of this chapter was to mold a Navy VC program in keeping with the scope of 
the VC industry, the objectives of the Navy and the drafted legislation before Congress.   
 The model presented in our recommendations is unique to the Navy and meets all 
of the above requirements.  Further, the model builds on core competencies already 
present in the Navy.  Also identified are the challenges of establishing such a program.  
This paper presents a workable solution to the Navy for entering the VC industry. 
 
F. FUTURE ISSUES WITH NAVY VENTURE CAPITAL 
 
 While this paper has identified if and how the Navy could enter the VC 
community, it has also raised a number of new issues that remain unanswered.  The first 
issue is the “jointness issue”, an issue which all DoD components must grapple with.  
This refers to the fact that DoD components need to think about jointness and not just 
unilaterally.  Over the past decade, DoD has been successful with this endeavor by 
designing common weapon systems, common support systems and joint commands.  It is 
therefore, only natural to ask about a joint DoD VC program as opposed to the piecemeal 
programs currently under study. 
 This is a noteworthy area for future research, but even so, there are a few points 
that can be addressed right now.  First, there are DoD programs underway in this area that 
were not discussed.  The most notable being the DeVenCI program headed by Dr. Steven 
King.208  This program was not presented in this paper because there is currently no 
information available to the public on the final version of the program.  From the little 
research that has been gathered, the program is intended to be a VC initiative, vice a VC 
fund.  This means that one of the goals of the program will be to align DoD needs with 
respect to VC.  The business plan on how this is to be done is still under development. 
 
208 Dr. King was interviewed for this paper and supplied us with the preliminary business plan for 
DeVenCI.  At the time of writing, the final version of the business plan was not available and we were told 
by Dr. King that it may differ significantly from the original plan.  As such, we chose not to include 
DeVenCI in Chapter  III, but instead, note it here as a possible model for future study. 
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 Aside from DeVenCI’s efforts, aligning all DoD components under one VC 
program will not be an easy task.  If trying to align the Navy’s VC goals is a challenge, 
trying to do it for all of DoD would require a herculean effort. The biggest issue is that 
each component will have its own needs based on the unique missions assigned to them.  
This large scope clashes with the specific focus normally found in VC programs.  This is 
not to say it will be impossible, but it will require a monumental undertaking with the full 
support of all services if it is to succeed.   
 The second issue, which can be related to jointness, is the funding issue that 
presents itself when dealing with VC in DoD.  A stumbling block for the Navy, funding 
will be even more difficult when considering a joint DoD VC program. As stated in 
previous chapters, one of the main reasons that this research recommends against 
establishing a Navy specific VC firm is the capital requirements that such an undertaking 
require.  In 2004, the average VC fund size was over $155 million dollars with over 29% 
of funds having over $250 million.209  The size of a fund correlates to how managers 
place investments.  A typical VC fund has a “hit ratio” of 10%, i.e. only one out of every 
ten investments proves to be profitable.210  With such a low “hit ratio”, VC funds need to 
place multiple investments to stand a reasonable chance of remaining profitable.   
 Relating this to the Navy, one of the biggest problems that this research found 
was the funding proposed for allocation to the VC program would not support the type 
and number of investments required in a VC fund.  As such, future research needs to 
identify a “critical mass”, which is an amount of money that would be required to sustain 
such a program.  Future research could analyze what this critical mass needs to be for not 






209 National Venture Capital Association Yearbook, New York: Thomson Venture Economics 
Information, 2005.
210 Based on interviews conducted with venture capitalists 
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G. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
 
 This research determined that the Navy could benefit from a VC program.  The 
VC community has gained a reputation in recent years as being a cradle for technological 
innovation.  The research presented in this paper suggests that the Navy could capitalize 
on this without starting is own VC fund.  While starting a Navy VC fund could also 
satisfy the Navy’s VC objectives, there is too much ambiguity in what the technology 
focus should be and how such a program should be funded.  As a result, the Navy should 
limit its VC program to expanding current programs in ONR though the drafted 
legislation currently before Congress.  
 Additionally, this research determined that it will take more than just funding to 
create a successful Navy VC program.  While the draft legislation before Congress is an 
important step, an infrastructure must be in place that will allow the money to be put to 
the best use.  The Navy currently has the knowledge in the form of the CTTO to properly 
use the funding for VC, but in order for this to happen, there needs to be specific 
legislation that identifies an office in ONR to implement the program.  The Navy does 
not need a specific VC firm to properly execute a VC program.  It does need a dedicated 
office to control the funding if it wishes to gain full advantage of what the VC 
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NAVY PROPOSED VC LEGISLATION 
 
                                                 
211 This appendix presents a proposed version of the Navy VC legislation.  It is presented in this paper 
only to allow the reader insight into the possible resources the Navy may allocate to the VC program.  This 
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APPENDIX B 
 In order to better understand the VC industry, it is important to understand how 
the size of a VC fund relates to the industry in which it invests.  The size of a VC fund 
greatly influences how the fund is put to use.  The size of a fund influences not only the 
size of the investments made but also the number of investments a fund can make and the 
number of industries in which it can invest.  Based on research conducted with venture 
capitalists, the fund size proves to be one of the most important aspects to consider when 
raising a fund.  Because of this, it is important to consider fund size with respect to any 
possible Navy VC fund. 
 
A. AGGREGATE FUND DATA FOR FUNDS THAT INVESTED IN 
INDUSTRIES OF INTEREST TO THE NAVY 
 
 In order to analyze fund size with respect to a potential Navy VC fund, the first 
objective was to define what industry areas the fund would likely be investing in.  After 
researching this through the CTTO’s website, a list was compiled of possible Venture 
Economics Industry Codes (VEIC) to classify what industries a Navy VC fund might 
want to invest in.212  This list includes the following industries: 
• VEIC 1510 – Local Area Network Technology 
• VEIC 1600 – Satellite Technology  
• VEIC 1800 – Defense Communications 
• VEIC 3200 – Batteries 
• VEIC 3300 – Power Supplies 
• VEIC 3810 – Military Electronics 
• VEIC 3835 – Security and Sensors 
 After this list was compiled, the next step was to research investments made into 
these industries.  To do this, the Thomson Financial’s VentureXpert database was used 
to search all investments placed in these VEICs from November 6, 2004 though 
 
212 VEICs are industry specific codes which define areas of VC investments. 
November 5, 2005.213  The investments were analyzed to determine the VC fund that 
made the investment.  Each VC fund that made an investment was then cross-
referenced to identify the fund size, the number of investments the fund made, the 
average size of the investments and the percent of the fund which has been invested.  
Once these data were gathered, they were then analyzed to determine the trends in these 
VEICs with respect to fund size and investment size (Table 4).  
 After analyzing the data, many new points can be addressed.  The first point 
relates to the average fund size for funds which have invested in the industries 
researched.  It was previously noted that the average VC fund size for 2004 was $155.4 
million.214  When looking at the more high technology focused funds that the Navy 
would be interested in, the average fund size increased significantly to $371.78 million 
(Figure 16).  It should come as no surprise that high technology requires larger 
investments and the data supports this assumption.  Across five of the six sectors 
analyzed, the average fund size was greater than $155.4 million.  As such, if the Navy 
were to start a VC fund at the proposed level, the fund would be capitalized at a 
significantly lower level than competing funds. 
















































Figure 16.   Fund Data for Funds that Invested in Navy Interest VEICs 
 
 When considering fund size, it is also important to consider what percentage of a 
fund is invested.  Here again, data show that the average fund matching the Navy’s 
interests only invests 62% of its value.  The reasoning behind this is most likely that a 
                                                 
213 VentureXpert. Thomson Financial. 6 Nov. 2005 <http://vx.thomsonib.com>. 
214 National Venture Capital Association Yearbook. New York: Thomson Venture Economics 
Information, 2005.    
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fund needs to keep money in reserve for additional financing rounds.  A fund also needs 
to provide money for operation and management fees which can run 7% to 18% of a 
fund’s value over its life.215  Both of these “costs” would be present in any fund the Navy 
might raise. 
 Related to fund size, is the average investment that a VC fund makes relative to 
the industry invested in.  Here, the data show that a typical VC fund’s investment is a 
very small portion of its value.  In five of the six industry sectors analyzed, the typical 
VC fund investment was less than 1% of the fund’s value (Figure 17). The only industry 
analyzed which had an average investment greater than 1% of fund value was the 
Satellite Technology VEIC.  In this VEIC, it is assumed that large investments are 
required based on the industry’s focus, but no definitive conclusion could be reached 
through the data provided by Thomson Financial.   
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Figure 17.   Fund Size vs. Mean Investment 
 
 This suggests that if a fund is small, the number of investments made seem to be 
small, as is the size of the investments.   If the Navy were to have a VC fund valued at 
less than $60 million, then it would most likely need to make investments 
disproportionately smaller then the competing funds if it were to make the same number 
                                                 
215 Kate Litvak. "Venture Capital Limited Partnership Agreements:  Understanding Compensation 
Arrangements." Columbia Law School and Economics Working Paper No. 254 (2004). 29 Oct. 2005 
<http://law.utexas.edu/law>.   
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of investments.  While the data show that it is possible to make smaller investments, the 
smaller investments would most likely limit the Navy’s visibility to the technology 
because the Navy would be a minor investor.  Discussions with venture capitalists show 
that while these small investments are common, they are done with the intent of expected 
financial returns, not technology visibility.  If the Navy fund were to make investments 
comparable to competing funds, then the fund would need to make significantly fewer 
investments, thereby limiting the technology it would have access to.   
 To put this aggregate data in perspective to the Navy’s potential resources, 
assume that the Navy was to start a fund with a $60 million value.216  Small funds lack 
the economies of scale present in larger funds so the management fees would be a 
significant portion of the Navy fund’s value.  It is reasonable to assume that over the life 
of the fund, management fees would amount to 15% of the funds value.  This would 
equate to management fees of $9 million over the life of the fund.  This would leave 
approximately $51 million available for investments.  If the fund managers make 70% of 
this balance available for initial investments, that would equate to $35.7 million. If the 
average investment the fund makes is around $2.5 million, that would equate to the fund 
making approximately 14 investments over its life with the initial funding provided.  As a 
basis for comparison, Figure 18 below shows that average number of companies that 
funds invest in for funds that have placed investments in the specific VEICs analyzed.  If 
some of the investments could be spun off in a profitable manner, then the fund would be 
able to make additional investments.  
 
216A $60 million dollar fund would mean that $20 million would be transferred for three years.  This 
would be the most optimistic scenario based on the draft appropriation presented in Appendix A. 
Average Number of Companies Invested in for Funds that 




















































































Average Number of Companies Invested in for Funds that Placed 
Investments in Specific VEIC 
Figure 18.   Number of Companies that Targeted Funds Invested In 
 
 
B. ARMY VENTURE CAPITAL FUND AND RELATED INVESTMENTS 
 
 The data presented up to this point suggest that it would not be in the Navy’s best 
interest to raise a Navy specific VC fund.  A logical follow-on question would be, 
considering these data, how do the other government funds operate?  In that the Navy 
draft legislation is similar to the Army’s legislation, OnPoint would seem to be a good 
point of comparison. 
 According to Thomson Financial’s VentureXpert database, OnPoint’s fund is 
valued at $48 million and has placed seven investments since its inception in 2003.217  
The fund size is very close to the average VC fund invested in the Battery Technology 
VEIC ($50.4 million), one of OnPoint’s technology focuses.  In addition to the Battery 
Technology VEIC (3200), Thomson Financial’s VentureXpert also shows that OnPoint 
has placed investments in the Power Supply VEICs (3300 series) and Semiconductor / 
Other VEIC (6599). 218  For funds that invest in the 3300 VEICs, the average fund size is 
                                                 
217 VentureXpert. Thomson Financial. 6 Nov. 2005 <http://vx.thomsonib.com>. 
218 OnPoint data from Thomson Financial’s VentureXpert were last updated on 13 Jul 2005.  Based on 
interviews conducted with OnPoint Managing Director Jason Rottenberg, OnPoint is known to have made 
eight investments.  Data for this section are based on the seven investments shown on Thomson’s 
VentureXpert and do not include the investment made into PowerPrecise Solutions Inc. 
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close to $210 million.  While this is larger than the OnPoint fund, it is still significantly 
lower than other funds that meet the Navy’s interests. 
 Even though OnPoint is a small fund, it makes relatively large investments.  
According to Thomson Financial’s VentureXpert, OnPoint’s investments have an average 
size of $3.508 million.219  This equates to an average investment of 7.3% of the funds 
value.  This is well above the average across the sectors analyzed, but is in keeping with 
the investment size required in the technology interest areas (Table 3).  Analysis suggests 
that OnPoint seems to be choosing to make fewer investments, but the investments it is 
making seem to be large enough to give OnPoint significant influence in the invested in 
company.   If the Navy’s goal with VC is technology identification, it would most likely 
need a similar strategy. 
 
 
Average Per Deal Data for Investments made from 11/6/04 - 11/5/05 
Fund Investment Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
All VEIC 2.8539 6.91 0.03 44 
1800 Defense 
Communications 
3.41 3.879 0.07 7.5 
3835 Security and Sensors 2.55 4.243 0.07 17.5 
3200 Batteries 0.27 0.3815 0.03 0.71 
3300 Power Generation 1.23 1.177 0.1 4.07 
1600 Satellite Technology 84.53 249.55 0.2 750 
1510 Local Area Networks 1.85 1.6294 0.03 6.53 
Table 3. Average Per Deal Data  
 
 When looking at these industries and the investments OnPoint made, one can see 
that OnPoint invests in industries that attract smaller funds (relative to the industries the 
Navy is interested in).  The corollary to this is that OnPoint is a highly focused fund.  
Because the Army mandated OnPoint focus on a specific need, OnPoint can thereby 
focus all of its resources in a few specific and related technologies.  This simplifies the 
research OnPoint must do and allows them to become experts in the industries.  This 
expertise may give OnPoint the ability to make better, more profitable (in terms of 
financial and technological returns) investments.     
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219 VentureXpert. Thomson Financial. 6 Nov. 2005 <http://vx.thomsonib.com>. 
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 Our research has not indicated similar circumstances with the Navy.  The Navy’s 
information needs (with respect to VC technology) seem to be too broad considering the 
resources that would be allocated.  If the Navy were to identify a specific technology 
focus, like the Army has done with OnPoint, then a Navy VC fund would stand a higher 
probability of success.   
  130
Table 4. VEIC Specific Data 
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